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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECT OF THE TEARTERS UNION ON SMAIL
TRUCKING FIRS IN THE BOSTON AREA
James J. S. Forese
Submitted to the School of ndustrial Management
on May 25, 1959 in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Science.
The Teamsters Union is said to be one of the most
powerful unions, if not the most powerful unicn, in the
United States. It is involved mainly in the trucking
industry which is growing quite rapidly. With the growth
of this industry there has appeared a great wave of consoli-
dation and liquidation among the firms operating within the
industry. Despite these mergers, there still is associated
with it a large percentage of small operators. One could
logically say that this giant union certainly must be
having some effect on this industry. In addition, these
effects may have different repercussions on the smaller
firms as compared to the larger firms. The basic thought
behind this study is to determine the effect, or effects,
of the Teamsters Union on the small to medium-sized trucker.
The study, as noted, is restricted to small to
medium-sized truckers. Two criteria are used to limit the
scope of this study. First, gross revenue of the carrier
should be between approximately 75,000 and 5 million.
Secondly, the carrier should be run by the person who was
supplying the investment for the operation. That is to say,
management and ownership of the carriers were not separated.
The method of analysis used to investigate the
problem was interviewing of operators of trucking firms to
obtain personal opinions of the corndiitions edxisting in the
industry. Although having the drawback of limited coverage,
this method afforded me the opportunity of directing my
questions toward specific points and clearing up any
ambiguities as they appeared. In order to bring consistency
into the interviews, compiled and used a questionnaire for
my interviewing.
The method of analysis used to attack the problem
has been subjective. To the extent that the conclusions are
based on this method of analysis, the conclusions reached are
not as sharply defined as one would like to make them.
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in general, the small carriers' answers to my queries lead me
to believe that many of the present union policies are
increasing operating costs for the small carriers above
what such costs are for the larger carriers. n turn, the
high operating costs are forcing many small carriers to
operate their firms at losses and near losses. To the extent
that such cost increases are preventing the small carriers
from responding to changing conditions affecting the operations
of their firms, the union is hampering the flexibility of
operations of the small carriers.
Thesis Advisor: Douglass V. Brown
Title: Sloan Professor of ndustrial Management
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CHAPT I
Summary of Study
A. The Problem and its Setting
The trucking industry was practically non-existent
prior to 1920. Today it has grown to be an important segment
of our economy. One of the reasons for this is that more and
more shippers have come to rely upon the industry for convenient,
quick, flexible transportation service. The operators of the
firms in the industry are men who have risen from the ranks
of employees. t is rare indeed to find at the head of any
trucking concern men who have not had a keen insight into the
conditions and problems of the business gained through first-
hand experience. A majority of the firms have been financed
by the savings of owners and loans from friends and suppliers.
It is not common to find the public in control of a trucking
business.
The nternational Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers is the labor union which has organized
the employees of this industry. A craft-industrial union in
structure, the Teamsters has been quite persistent in organizing
all workers within its jurisdiction. Although the locals in the
larger cities are split up into various craft groups, the locals
in the smaller cities have been predominantly mixed". Most of
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the locals in the New England area are of the latter type. In
particular, the Boston Local is this type.
The Teamsters are mainly involved in an industry
which has grown and is still growing prodigiously. Wlth this
growth there has appeared a great wave of consolidations and
liquidations among the firms in the industry. Despite these
mergers there still is associated with it, as there always
has been, a large percentage of small operators. One could
logically say that this giant union certainly must be having
some effect on the industry. Moreover, these effects may
have different repercussions on the smaller firms as compared
to the larger firms. The purpose of this research is to
determine the effect$, or effect$; of the Teamsters Union on
the small to medium-sized trucker.
B. Scope of the Study
The problems of how to determine and measure a small
to medium-sized trucker is one of comparison. Of the numerous
ways to give the comparative size of a carrier have chosen two.
First, gross revenue of the carrier should be between approxi-
mately $75,000 and $5 million. This, to me, was a logical cut-
off point because the maximum business done last year by any
one firm was approximately $50 to $55 million. At $5 million
gross revenue a carrier approaches economy of scale which takes
it out of my small-trucker category. Secondly, if the carrier
was doing less than $5 million but the management of the
company has been separated from the ownership, I did not class
the carrier within my category of small trucker. The reason
for this is that, although this only happened in a few instances,
I was not interested in interviewing people who were not using
and responsible for their own invested capital. My rationale
behind talking only to owners was that wanted to determine
whether there was any effect on incentive produced by the
union on the owners. did not feel that this fact, if it
existed, could be determined by talking to managers alone.
In the course of my study I learned of many things
which originally had never thought about investigating. For
example, problem areas such as lack of employer co-operation,
rate cutting by the employers, and some corruption among the
employers were brought to my attention during my interviews.
Some of these became so predominant and relevant to my other
problems that investigated the problems further. The
results of this side investigation proved that many of the
employers' problems arise within their own ranks and are not
due to the union.
C. Research Methods Employed
The method of analysis used to investigate the
problem was interviewing of operators to obtain personal
opinions of the conditions existing in the industry. In order
to bring consistency into the interviewing, compiled and used
a questionnaire.
The questionnaire was compiled after many conversa-
tions with the executive secretary of the Employer Group in
Boston. Not only did the secretary help me to compile it,
but she also had to check every question to make sure that 
would not ask the employers something they would not be able
to divulge or which they would not want to answer because of
fear that it might injure their standing with the union.
The reasons for choosing personal interviews with
a questionnaire instead of mailing a questionnaire to carriers
in the area (and the country for that matter), which has the
obvious advantage of greater coverage, are the following:
first, there have been no such studies undertaken in this
subject, which forced me to devise my questionnaire from
scratch; secondly, since had to compile my o questionnaire,
I was not sure what type of answers might receive and by
taking the questionnaire around could direct my questions
more specifically and clear up any ambiguities; thirdly, it
was pointed out to me, and later confirmed this, that this
particular group of employers was not very well educated, and
they might not be capable of answering a questionnaire competently;
and fourthly, by taking the questionnaire around, was able
visually to inspect many operations and learn a great deal more
about the over-all industry than would have had sent out
the questions. Of course personal interviewing had the effect
of further limiting the scope of this study to the immediate
area around Boston.
D. Major Conclusions
This study sought to determine what the effects of
the Teamsters Union are on the operation of small carriers.
The method of analysis used to attack the roblem has been
subjective. To the extent that the conclusions are based on
this method of analysis, the conclusions reached are not as
sharply defined as one would like to make them. On the other
hand, the study has revealed many interesting areas for
further endeavor.
In general, the small carriersI answers to my
queries lead me to believe that the present local's seniority
policy and method of over-all industry contract negotiations,
lack of consideration of whether firms mainly operate locally
or between cities, policy on wage rates, and a few subtle
ofo*ere~l J'3
schemesAare increasing operating costs for the small carriers
above what such costs are for the larger carriers. In turn,
the high operating costs are forcing many small carriers to
operate their enterprises at a loss. To the extent that such
cost increases are preventing the small carriers from responding
to changing conditions affecting the operation of their firms,
the union is hampering the flexibility of operation of the
small carriers.
But, the study has revealed that the industry is
complex and many factors in addition to the union enter into
the decisions affecting the operation of a trucking firm.
-6-
Carriers are plagued with a lack of employer co-operation.
The industry is still suffering from corruptive forces
operating within the firms and between operators and the
union. Small carriers also feel that the nterstate Commerce
Commission has policies which work against the small carrier
and for the large carrier. These latter forces, also operating
within the industry, may also be having an adverse effect on
carrier operation. Moreover, many of the adverse effects of
the union may be overestimated and enlarged due to the
presence of the other forces.
CHAPTER I
Background for the Study
A. ntroductory Comments
The trucking industry was practically non-existent
prior to 1920. Today it has grown to be an important segment
of our economy. One of the reasons for this is that more and
more shippers have come to rely upon it for convenient and
flexible transportation service. Of all the modern means of
transportation, that by truck has proved to be the form most
easily adaptable to today's multiplicity of needs - so much so
that it now reaches into nearly every phase of our daily
living.
The majority of the employers in this industry are
men who have risen from the ranks of employees. It is rare
indeed to find at the head of any trucking concern men who
have not had a keen insight into the conditions and problems
of the business gained through first-hand experience. Again,
a majority of the firms have been financed by the savings of
owners and loans from friends and equipment suppliers. It is
not common to find the public in control of a trucking business;
nor is it common to find a firm in which he control is not in
the hands of the founder or his family. Therefore, the operators
have largely come up from the ranks, and the development of the
industry is due to their reinvestment in it of personal savings.
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The industry is known for the small size of many of
its operators. The best measure of size of any firm within
an industry is revenue. For the tralcking industry, revenue
statistics for companies doing over $200,000 are easily
available; however, for firms doing less than this figure,
comparable statistics are not available. However, there is
another way to approach size, and that is through number of
trucks owned, since revenue is highly correlated to the
number of trucks. It has been estimated that in 1956,
of all the "for-hire trucking enterprises", 50.3% of the
enterprises are one-vehicle, owner-operated finms, 12.6% own
two trucks, 9.4% own three or four trucks, 9.2% own five to
nine trucks, and 18.5% own ten or more trucks. 1 This means
that 81.5% of these firms within the industry have less than
ten trucks.
With the "age of management" in full swing, as might
be expected, the trucking industry also is starting to develop
a class of managers who are not drivers and have not come up
through the ranks. Most of these men are with the very large
companies and are engaged as traffic managers and rate men.
m . ... 
1 Motor Truck Facts, 1957 Edition. Washington, D.C.: Automobile
Manufacturers Association, 1957, p. 48. These data are projected
figures for the United States, based on facts and calculations
for ten eastern and ten western states.
Occasionally they are ound in medium-sized firms, but rarely
have they attained the leadership of an enterprise. As the
industry develops and concentration of the industry goes into
fewer and fewer hands, this group will be increasingly important
and efficiency of management will increase proportionately.
The nternational Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers is the labor union which has organized
the employees of this industry. A craft-industrial union in
structure, the Teamsters has been quite persistent in organizing
all workers within its jurisdiction. Although the locals in
the larger cities are split up into various craft groups, the
locals in the smaller cities have been predominantly "lmixed".
Most of the locals in the New England area are of +he latter
type.
This study undertakes to determine what the effect
of the Teamsters Union - Local 25 - has been on the small to
medium-sized trucker in the Boston area.
B. Definition of Terms
The trucking industry, like most others, has a
vocabulary which is peculiar to itself. Although many of the
terms are in general use, some are not. The more important
2
ones are defined as follows:
2The definitions are taken from the following sources: Motor Carrier
Act of 1935, Superintendent of Documents. WVashington, D.C.: Public
Document No. 255, 74th Congress; Hill, S.E., Teamsters and Transporta-
tion: Employee-Employer Relationships in New England. ashington,
D.C.; American Council on Public Affairs, 942; Reyolds,L.G.,
Labor Economics and Labor Relations. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, nc., 954.
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1. Common Carrier: As defined in the Motor Carrier
Act, "The term common carrier by motor vehicle' means any
person who or which undertakes, whether directly or by lease
or any other arrangement, to transport passengers or property,
or any class or classes of property, for the general public in
interstate or foreign commerce by motor vehicle for compensation,
whether over regular or irregular routes, including such motor
vehicle operations of carriers by rail or water, and of express
or forwarding companies, except to the extent that these
operations are subject to the provisions of Part ."I
2. Contract Carrier: The term contract carrier
by motor vehicle' means any person, not included under paragraph
(14) of this section, who or which, under special and individual
contracts or agreements, and whether directly or by a lease or
any other arrangement, transports passengers or property in
interstate or foreign commerce by motor vehicle for compensation."
3. Private Carrier: "The term private carrier of
property by motor vehicle' means any person, not included in
the terms, common carrier by motor vehicle' or 'contract
carrier by motor vehicle,' who or which transports in interstate
or foreign commerce by motor vehicle property of which such
person is the owner, lessee, or bailee, when such transportation
is for the purpose of sales, lease, rent or bailment, or in
furtherance of any commercial enterprise."t
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4. Road Driver: The person who drives his truck
for relatively long distances with few stops to unload or
load.
5. Local Driver: The person who drives his truck
for short hauls and usually has many stops to pick up and
unload freight.
6. Helper: A helper is an employee who rides with
the driver of a truck and who has the duty of assisting the
driver in loading and unloading the truck.
7. Platform men: These men never drive any trucks.
They are used in. the hauling of freight on the shipping f oors
of either terminals or garages of the companies.
8. Riggers: These men perform a special labor,
which is the dismantling, removal and erection of very heavy
pieces of machinery. They are a very highly skilled group.
9. Terminal: This may be a building specifically
built to handle, move and store freight from one truck to
another, or it may be a building converted into a terminal
such as a garage or warehouse. New buildings are usually much
more efficient than converted garages or warehouses because of
freight-handling considerations designed into the structure.
10. Grandfather Rights: In the Motor Carrier Act
of 1935 operating rights were promulgated as follows:
-12.
If any such carrier or predecessor in interest was
in bona fide operation as a common carrier by motor
vehicle on June , 1935, over the route or routes
or within the territory for which application is
made and has so operated since that time, or if
engaged in furnishing seasonal service only, was in
bona fide operation on June , 1935, during the
season ordinarily covered by its operation, except
in either instance as to interrution of service
over which the applicant or its predecessor in
interest had no control, the nterstate Commerce
Commission shall issue such certificate without
requiring further proof that public convenience and
necessity will be served by such operation, and with-
out further proceedings, if application for such
certificate is made to the commission within 120
days after this section shall take effect.
Rights granted under this section of the Motor Carrier Act
are known as Grandfather Rights.
11. Closed Shop: That employment policy adopted by
the union whereby a man must be a union member before he can
be hired by an employer.
12. Union Shop: That employment policy adopted by
the union which permits the employer complete freedom of hiring,
but provides that new employees must become union members by
some specified time.
13. Dead Heading: Riding as passengers on a company
truck driven by another man, or bringing back an empty trailer
or truck is known as dead heading.
14. Operating Ratio: The profit position of a carrier
in the trucking industry is usually expressed in the form of an
operating ratio. The operating ratio is the percentage
relationship of expenses to gross revenue.
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C. The ndustry3
1. Nature of Local Conditions
Trucking concerns engaged in the business of common
carrier of general freight and commodity handling will have an
organization similar to the fol lowing: the firm will have a
terminal (or a garage, if business does not warrant a terminal)
in which shipments of freight may be stored and transferred
from truck to truck. This terminal will necessitate the employ-
ment of platform men to help the drivers in moving freight from
platform to trucks and tracks to platforms. Depending on the
size of the firm, it may have more than one terminal. These
terminals also have shops where the firm's maintenance crew
performs all necessary repairs on equipment. n addition, the
smaller operators will have their business offices and clerical
help located in the terminal building.
The firm will need mainly two types of equipment:
large trucks carrying a big load and small trucks carrying a
relatively smaller load. Small trucks usually can accommodate
3This material has been gathered together from several sources.
A large part of it has come from general background interviews
with Miss M. McCaffrey of the Employers Group of Motor Freight
Carriers, nc.; Mr. John M. Bresnahan of the American Trucking
Association, nc.; Mr. John B. Mastrangelo of Breeman Transfer
Co., Inc., Leechburg, Penna.; and the local carriers. For some
early history of the industry and the Teamsters Union, used
The Teamsters Union: A Study of its Economic Impact by
Robert D. Leiter. Hill's Teamsters and Transportation provided
some added historical facts and conditions for the local area.
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five to seven tons, while the larger units carry from 15 to 20
tons. The large trucks are used for line haul work between
cities, and the smaller units are used for transporting freight
within a city, to and from the terminal to shippers and
consignees. Frequently freight is not brought to the terminal
at all, when one shipper has a full truckload to be shipped.
However, this may also occur if two or three shipments are
placed on a truck and it would not be as profitable for the
operator to go to the expense of sending out smaller trucks
for pick-up and delivery.
Although the companies under consideration are
classed as common carriers, their schedules are not comparable
in the least in regularity with other types of common carriers,
such as railroads and airlines. Railroads and airlines, etc.,
move, in a majority of cases, regularly scheduled runs which
must operate whether or not there is sufficient traffic or
freight to meet expenses. On the other hand, trucking company
schedules are made up to conform to shippers and are therefore
very irregular. Operators are not permitted to refuse to make
shipment merely because the shipper does not offer enough to
make it profitable, but in many instances this situation occurs.
The method of refusal is to tell the prospective customer that
there is a tie-up or rush of business such that it is impossible
for the operator to have a truck available at the time required
by the shipper. There is no means of checking this so that the
customer could compel the firm to accept the business.
But, many trucking firms do conform to fairly regular
schedules. This is not to be construed to mean that trucks are
to leave a given terminal for another at a specified hour. Rather,
it is to indicate a fairly constant time at which major parts of
the dayts work are to be completed, with the routing and
scheduling of trucks quite dependent upon shippers' demands and
needs. Except for some specialized haulers, the companies
operate on a 24-hour basis. During tday the smaller trucks
pick up and deliver freight which has been brought in by the
road trucks, or the road trucks may be used themselves to
deliver the freight. During the afternoon and evening,
freight accumulated during the day is sorted and placed on the
road trucks for delivery to other terminals and destinations.
According to regulations promulgated by the regulating
agencies of the industry, carriers are able to accept practically
anything for shipment. However, there are some limitations such
as goods having high value, great bulk or anything which may
have an inherent danger which may cause possible damage to
other cargo or goods.4 Otherwise the carrier will accept
practically anything offered for shipment.
4For a general idea of commodities not accepted for shipment,
see the citation of the Uniform Motor Freight Classification
or page 4 of Hill's Teamsters and Transportation.
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Within the industry, because o the fact that there
is a requirement of particular equipment to handle certain
types o work, there is a fair amount of specialization in
commodity hauling. The Boston area has four groups of carriers:
companies specializing in fish transportation, wool hauling,
produce transportation and general freight hauling. ncluded
in the last category is a group which is active in heavy machinery
and equipment hauling.
The first group is composed of carriers specializing
in fish hauling. To do this type of work requires refrigerated
equipment and in some cases special equipment inside the truck.
The quantity of fish received in the Boston area conditions the
principal use to which this type of equipment is put, but
in some cases it may be used for hauling other commodities.
The second group of carriers - the wool haulers - is
small in total. This work is somewhat specialized, since the
transportation of wool requires a special kind of equipment
if any economy is to be attained in the work. The trick used
for wool transportation generally has the body built out over
the cab of the truck such that part of the load is carried on
top of the cab, and has open sides and no top. The rationale
behind this is that the weight of the load is small when compared
with its bulk, and the only restrictions to load are clearance
of bridges, etc. The loading of these trucks, to insure against
possible turnover, requires a special skill on the part of the
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loaders. As a result, there is some special skill required by
such handlers, but this is almost the only group where any
experience is needed to handle a job within the industry.5
The third group, and a fairly large one, is that
specializing in hauling produce to and from the railroad sheds
and the wholesale fruit and vegetable markets in Boston. The
majority of this work is local, but theseAalso engage in
operations over long distances.
The fourth and largest group is that composed of
those doing general freight hauling. While those in this group
may on occasion carry goods normally carried by concerns
specializing in the other areas mentioned - such as the hauling
of wool during either of the two seasonal peaks of wool transporta-
tion - they are more concerned with general freight hauling and
do not make an effort to attract other types of business. Note
should be taken of the fact that in some cases one concern may
be engaged in several of these fields at the sae time, so that
it is sometimes hard to place a carrier in one particular group
of carriers. 6
5Another group of workers within the industry which also requires
some special skill is the riggers.
6There are two other types of carrier of some significance in the
area - those moving furniture and household goods and those
hauling gasoline and oil. The latter group is almost
exclusively private carriers. Since neither group is a member
of the Employers Group, it was impossible for me to make any
appointments for interviews with employers within these groups.
The same was true as regards attempting to interview concerns
exclusively hauling produce or fish.
Regardless of the commodities which trackers carry,
all firms in interstate business, subject to the Motor Carrier
Act of 1935, can be placed in one of the following three
categories: (1) common carrier, (2) contract carrier,
(3) private carrier.7 Common carriers are those who serve
the public generally in the transportation of all kinds of
commodities between all points permitted them by the regulatory
commission. On the other hand, contract carriers do not serve
the general public but restrict themselves to operations
conducted under ctract with certain shippers. This latter
group has the advantage of being able to operate under relatively
regular schedules, since they are assured of a more constant
flow of freight, as compared with the common carrier. The
advantage to this is that the contract carrier has to maintain
less reserve equipment, but the big disadvantage, in many cases,
is that these companies do not have return loads because the
firms for which they haul freight only send goods in one direction
and have little or nothing for the trucker to bring back.
Several persons with whom have talked have said that this
factor is driving the contract carrier out of the business.
The last class of carriers is composed of the private
carrier. This group is not in business to serve the public in
any capacity and the firms only carry goods in which they them-
selves are interested. Because of the fact that a good number
7See the preceding section on definitions to obtain the
Motor Carrier Act of 1935 definitions of the carriers.
. . , . .~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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of firms require special equipment to carry and handle their
products, there are quite a few private carriers. The other
major reason for private carriers is that some companies have
found it cheaper to transport their own goods.
Statistics on the size and growth of the industry have
been very hard to gather. One indication of the growth of the
entire industry, in general, is that given by Transport Research,
Inc. They show that for all carriers in the United States,
having a gross revenue in excess of $200,000, total revenues
have increased from $2.5 billion to $3.4 billion from 1950 to
1954. In the New England area, during the same period, gross
revenues increased from $300 million to $4lO million. There is,
however, no indication of the growth or decline of the firms
doing less than $200,000, and it has been estimated that there
are quite a number of these smaller firms.
Competition within the industry has always been keen
both internally and externally. The former has taken place
very actively with respect to service, i.e., there has been
much competition between companies in the matter of arranging
schedules to suit shipper convenience and in providing as fast
transportation as possible. A result of this desire to get
ITt is hard to determine the best basis to indicate the size of an
industry. Such things as total number of miles traveled, tons
of freight carried, average number of people employed, or total
revenue within a period all might be valid estimates under
different conditions. have chosen to use total revenue.
Although revenue statistics do not include firms doing less than$200,000, other statistics on firms belmow this size also are not
available. The reason for this is that the T.C.C. permits such
firms the opportunity to exclude certain information because of
their size, and also to submit less reports than the larger firms
are required to submit. See The Red Book, Transport Research, Inc.,
Washington, D.C.: 1955.
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business at any cost has been that many companies have undertaken
to move freight which could not adequately bear the cost of
shipment by truck. Another result of this is that in attempting
to move goods whenever shippers desired them moved, many
companies never considered whether they had enough additional
freight at hand to make it worthwhile to send a truck to a
given point. The more progressive firms have become aware of
this problem and have attempted to eliminate the movement of
freight wnich does not carry a compensatory rate and to wait
until there is sufficient freight on hand before sending out
a truck. But the smaller firmns still handle this non-compensatory
type of business and, to be sure, many of them must do it to
remain in business.
There has been a great deal of competition within the
industry between common carriers and contract carriers. The
contract carriers often carry goods at rates substantially below
those which common carriers can afford to quote, with the
guarantee from the shipper of a certain amount of tonnage per
period. This has been the case where an operator has two con-
tracts for service in opposite directions, such tat he does
not have to run his trucks empty half the time. n a great
deal of cases the contract carriers were merely common carriers
who had obtained contracts with a few customers for the shipment
of their freight and who go outside of these contractual bounds
in order to gain whatever freight is necessary to make up full
loads .
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The major outside competition facing the trucking
industry has been that offered by the railroad industry.
However, it would probably be fairer to state that the trucking
industry has been the major competition to the railroad industry,
since the former has gained revenues at the expense of the
latter. Two of the leading factors for this gain of the
truckers over the railroad have been the more efficient service
feature of trucks and the decline of truck rates, relative to
railroad rates. To counteract this "pilferage" of business
by the truckers, the railroads have speeded up their freight
service and inaugurated door-to-door truck services to meet the
competition of the trucking firms. This latter speed-up has
been accomplished through the use of the various schemes of
piggyback operations of the railroads. n general, competition
between trucks and railroads has become very sensitive to minor
changes in rates and service started by the other.9
2. Costs in the ndustry
The subject of costs in the industry is extremely complex.
Even though there has been a demand for accurate accounting state-
ments of finance from the firms by the .C.C., there are many
9 The other major source of competition is the use of private
trucks owned by the companies which do their own hauling.
With the coming of higher shipping costs many concerns are
beginning to look into the feasibility of doing their own
freight hauling.
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ways of "stacking" the figures and distorting the results. T
am convinced that it will always remain a mystery how a company
can have an operating ratio consistently over 100.0 and still
manage to stay in business.
I have chosen to use figures compiled by Transport
Research, nc., as my estimate of the current industry costs
in the United States and in the New England area. Thlere are
two restrictions on these statistics. First, the tables listed
in Appendix I are only for the years 1950 to 1954, inclusive;
secondly, the figures do not include any firms having an annual
1.~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~1
volume of less than $200,000.1l These figures, on the other hand,
do serve to indicate the approximate relationship between various
cost components of the industry. In addition, have included
several tables to attempt to show cost and revenue trends
developing in the industry.
Table gives a frequency distribution for selected
characteristics of the intercity common carriers of general
freight for the United States and for the New England-1-iddle-
Atlantic area. The breakdown of the operating revenues shows
one important fact. The NE-M-A area has a higher percentage
of firms doing an annual volume less than $700,000. also
have learned through the Employers Group that the E (not a
combination of the New England and Middle Atlantic areas) area
10There are a few borderline cases - companies doing less than
$200,000 - included in the statistics.
has the highest percentage of firms in the various country
regions doing a volume less than $200,000. A look at the
operating ratios shows that the NE-1'i-A area has a greater
number of firms operating with ratios greater than 100.0.
The ratio of labor costs to operating revenues shows that the
NE-M-A area also has a higher labor cost structure than the
over-all industry.
Table II gives a summary of the operating statements
for intercity common carriers of general freight for the
United States and for New England. One significant factor
that is immediately evident is the higher operating ratio
for the New England carriers. There are many ratios which
might be calculated from these data. Two seem particularly
relevant to me. First, the ratio of total labor expense,
which includes all supervision, to operating revenues gives
a figure of 53 per cent for the United States and 58.2 per cent
for New England; secondly, the ratio of labor expense, excluding
any supervision, to operating revenues gives a figure of 32.2
per cent for the United States and 36.1 per cent for the local
area. Although not conclusive in themselves, think those
figures point to a higher cost of labor for the local area for
intercity transportation.
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Similarly, in Table I, which gives a summary of
operating statements for local common carriers of general
freight, the same ratios can be computed. The ratio of total
labor expense to operating revenue is 61.4 per cent for the
United States and 67.5 per cent for New England; that of
labor expense, minus supervision, to operating expense is 3.4
for the United States and 46.8 for the New England area.
Perhaps the most important facts revealed from these ratios
as compared to those in Table IT are the high labor cost of
local trucking and the economy of scale that can be obtained
through long" hauls. Another interesting thing shown in
Table III is the very high operating ratio of local trucking
in the New England area. t would appear that this type of
hauling should not be handled by trucking firms since their
expenses exceed their revenues.
Table V, which is a summary of both general freight
and special commodity carriers, gives a breakdown for the
United States, subdivided into intercity and local hauling.
Types of carriers included in this table which were not in the
other tables are automobiles, heavy machinery, household goods
and petroleum carriers. Again, the ratio of total labor to
operating expenses gives a figure of 8.0 per cent for the grand
total, 46.7 per cent for intercity hauling and 61.5 per cent for
local freight. The ratio of labor, minus supervision, to operating
expense indicates a figure of 29.3 per cent for the total, 28.0
for intercity and 41.7 per cent for local. These figures plus
the aggregate operating ratios show that throughout the industry
local hauling is categorically more expensive from the labor-
cost viewpoint and from the over-all expense viewpoint.
Tables V and VI have been included to show the trend
of revenue and of costs in the industry. n practically every
instance for each category freigt revenues have increased and
the cost of handling the freight has increased. The important
feature of the figures in both Table V and VT is that although
revenues and costs have increased, costs have increased at a
faster rate than revenues. This point is illustrated very well
by the constantly increasing operating ratio for the various
categories of trucking.
3. Technological Advances1l
There has always been a demand for more powerful and
faster equipment, for the road work and for terminal work, in the
industry. Undoubtedly the pressure for this has stemmed from
the rising cost of labor. The biggest way of increasing the
efficiency of trucks is to decrease the weight of the body,
therefore permitting more pay load to be carried. This is one
1The biggest technological changes in the industry came during
the 1925-1935 period when such things as the pneumatic tire,
the development of devices permitting the use of trailers and
semi-trailers, and radical iLmprovements in engines, resulting
in economy of fuel were introduced.
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reason for the rise in usage of stainless steel and particularly
aluminum in the building of trailers. A further development
will be the elimination of trailer frames. The elimination of
the frame, which will save a great deal of weight, is still
being tested, but it is being delayed by failure to design
floors strong enough to eliminate the need of a frame. Alloy
steels, such as stainless, will help develop this type of a
trailer. Many of these improvements have already been
incorporated on new truck design, thus increasing the pay load.
However, the costs of such trucks are much higher than
"conventional" trudks, and it ill still be several years before
a majority of the industry has this new equipment.
The work performed in the terminal is mainly that of
an unskilled sort, and is composed of shifting freight from
one truck to another or from the terminal to the truck (or
vice versa). Mst of this work is done by hand, by hand
trucks or by mechanized work trucks, with the latter being the
latest technological advance of any significance. The major
drawback in setting up any production-line system of freight
movement in the terminals is the lack of uniformity of freight
and in many cases the lack of an adequate volume of freight.
Before one can even consider any expensive setup for the move-
ment of freight, the previous two requirements must be met. A
good way to increase the efficiency of the terminal is in the
original design. But, here again, many truckers do not build
terminals; they either take over a garage or an old terminal.
- -7
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Any future technological changes in the industry will
either be in the improvement of trucks or of terminals. But
it is quite apparent that there are greater possibilities of
labor-saving devices in the terminals and platforms than in
trucks.
The union has not been concerned particularly ith
technological changes in the industry. There are two reasons
for this: first, the industry is growing quite rapidly, so
that any labor-displacing effect which any changes may have
had has been offset by expansion; secondLy, the union has
not had to face technological changes of sufficient importance
to cause any great amount of unemployment or any substitution of
an inferior skill for a superior one. The changes which the
union has had to face have not been radical but gradual and
relatively unimportant. As a result the union has no specific
policy on how to combat an advance in technology.
Due to the rapid growth of the industry, the union
has never resisted the introduction of lighter, faster trucks.
On the other hand, the unions have sporadically resisted the
introduction of various terminal devices which may have eliminated
freight handlers. The union is presently resisting two innova-
tions, or technological changes, which have occurred outside of
the industry, but which have had an indirect effect on the
trucking industry. The first is the use of the super highways
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arnd the second is the use of the various railroad piggyback
means of freight hauling.
4- Regulation by Commission
The nterstate Commerce Commission was given
regulatory powers by Congress through the Motor Carrier Act of
1935. The most important activities of the Commission have to
do with driver and truck safety regulation, granting of operating
rights and regulation of the rate structure. In prescribing a
set of rules intended to further safety of driving, the Commission
has merely elaborated on a general set of rules for safe
driving which any ordinary driver of a motor vehicle would be
expected to observe. There are rather detailed rules governing
truck equipment, such as lighting of vehicles, brakes, wind-
shield wipers, safety glass, etc., which are all deemed
necessary for safe operation of any vehicle. in addition,
there are requirements dealing with eyesight, hearing, usage
of liquor and habit forming drugs, driving experience and skill,
and knowledge of .C.C. rules for the drivers of vehicles which
come under the Commission's regulation.
The .C.C. has complete control over the development
of the indcstry by the power granted it to act on applications
for permits to operate. When the Commission first came into
its regulatory power over the industry, it had to act to
determine the so-called grandfather rights" of each carrier.
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That is, it had to determine who was to be permitted to carry
what over hich routes and territories. Once this was settled
the Commission had only to deal with new applications for
permission to operate and with applications of existing
carriers for permission to extend the number of routes which
they presently serve. However, the Commission does not have
any power to restrict the expansion of operations by existing
Y
carriers, so long as they restrict themselves to the territories
for which they are certified. A further power granted to the
Commission is that to control mergers, purchases, and other
forms of consolidation of trucking enterprises. Naturally, it
may not compel mergers or consolidations, but it may impede or
prevent them where the Commission deems it wise. This restric-
tion is a must to prevent any company from buying up all the
rights in an area and creating a monopoly of trucking service.
Before the .C.C. appeared in the trucking industry,
there was no established basis for rates. There were no
published tariffs, and no one knew what his competitors' rates
were. With the requirement from the Commission to submit rates,
there developed a great deal of price cutting, so much so that
the industry finally asked the Commission to set minimum tariffs
for all commodities. It does this with the help of various motor
rate bureaus throughout the country. Today there are two types
of rates charged by carriers. One is the class rate and the
other is the commodity rate. Class rates depend on the density
PI
)
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or number of pounds per cubic foot of goods to be moved. Opposed
to these are the commodity rates which are specific rates
applicable to specific commodities. The latter are special
rates which are always different from those which would be
obtained by applying the class rate system to the commodities
involved, and usually lower than the class rates. There is
always a sufficient volume associated with the commodity
involved to justify a trucker's use of the commodity rate
over the class rate.
The effects of the Commission have been many fold.
The rules pertaining to safety regulations benefit both the
union men and the employers. n effect, they raise the average
qualification of employees and the employers are able to pay
better wages to more efficient employees. Safety regulations,
conmbined with the regulation of admission, have reduced the
competition in the industry, especially by decreasing the
number of small one or two truck owner-operators. n the long
run the restrictive regulation of entry will better the union
position through bettering the operating positions of the
remaining carriers. However, this entry restriction may be
protecting existing firms from the competition of possible
future firms and causing a lower rate of technological advance
than would otherwise be present. Rate regulation is definitely
to the advantage of the unions because such regulation in effect
brings freight rate stability into the industry and thus raises
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over-all freight rates. This stability, in turn, tends to
keep wage rates at a higher level. t will remain so as long
as the Commission is restricted to its present activities
and does not obtain some measure of control over wages through
powers of mediation and arbitration. Rate regulation is also
beneficial to the employers since it theoretically prevents
price cutting.
5. Employer Organizations
Employer organizations are handicapped by their
inability to recruit 100 per cent of their potential membership
as well as by their comparative youth. There have been many
organizations of employers in the New England area in the last
two decades, but only a few have remained to be of any value
to employers. n a majority of cases these groups had no
permanent staffs, and it was hard to define their duties.
They usually became active only inen crises arose which
demanded action on the part of all employers. Organizations of
employers fall into two categories - those concerned with labor
problems and the negotiation of contracts, and those concerned
with problems developing from the regulatory commissions.
The employers' groups in the New England area have not
been too successful, except the Boston group known as the Employers
12Group of Motor Freight Carriers.2 The Boston association
1 2There are employers groups in Lynn, Lawrence, Lowell and Harverhill,
for example, which negotiate contracts collectively for their
members with the locals in the area. These organizations have
been nothing more than informal groups which appoint negotiating
committees to meet with the locals when contracts expire and
make new contracts.
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maintains a full-time staff composed of an executive secretary,
an assistant to this secretary and a legal counselor. The
secretary (who also happens to be a lawyer) is charged with
engaging in negotiations for contracts and also settling
problems with the union which may arise during the life of the
contract. This latter feature of the function of this employer
group distinguishes it from others in the New England area
because other groups have a tendency to settle employer and
union grievances not through the employer organization but
directly between union and company.
Those employers'groups not maintaining a full-time
staff of officers are concerned only with negotiations of
contracts and do not deal with a very wide range of problems.
As stated previously, they are active only during the negotiation
of contracts. However, this is not the case with the groups,
such as the Employers Group of Boston, which maintain salaried
officers. These persons not only negotiate the contract, but
are in constant touch with labor problems, and always ready to
help members in the solution of their difficulties in dealing
with a local or locals (as the case may be). In effect, they
are the equivalent of personnel or labor relations experts or
members belonging to the association. Most of the individual
companies belonging to these associations are too small to
maintain a full-time or part-time man in the activity. These
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companies have therefore joined togethier to urchase as a group
what they could not do individually. Only two or three of the
extremely large companies have any kind of a staff with a
labor relations semblance.
The Employers Group of Motor Freight Carriers of
Boston has approximately 120 members out of an approximate
total potential membership of 00. But, they represent
85 per cent of the manpower employed in the area. Prior to
the formation of the Boston employer group, the Boston local
held mass meetings of employers, at Rhich officials of the
local presented their new contracts. This method was very
cumbersome, and when the local carriers took the initiative in
forming an employers' group, the Teamsters local encouraged it.
Z
it is said that the union encourages employer organization not
only because of the efficiency in dealing with a group rather
than individual members, but also because tle union felt that
contracts could be enforced better through employer associations
(and the same holds for the negotiation of new contracts).
A major problem always facing the Boston employers'
group is that of membership in the organization. More specifically,
the problem is one of recruiting a membership which will retain
its unity when confronted with opposition from the union Tin
past years and at the present time, the strength of employer
organizations in negotiations with locals has usually been
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seriously weakened, and sometimes destroyed, by dissension among the
ranks of employers. The paramount element which hampers employers,
efforts to strengthen their position as a group is the weak, some-
times marginal, financial position of many carriers who cannot afford
a long strike. The employers group has always been plagued by
enough carriers in this position - who threaten to go outside the
association to sign with the local in order to gain operating
privileges - to force the employers group as a whole to take a
weaker position against the demands of the union than it would
otherwise have done.
-Tn addition to groups set up to deal with the problems of
labor relations, the local carriers belong to an association designed
to deal with rate questions and other situations arising out of
regulation of the industry by the nterstate Commerce Commission.
Although the membership of the two groups is largely the same, the
rate-making organization is quite separate and distinct from the
labor relations group. The New England Motor Rate Bureau is the most
important of several bureaus located throughout New England. ts
job has been to advise the I.C.C. on minimum rate schedules for the
New England area and to gather data for presentation to the 1.0.C.
in connection with further establishment of minimum rates and
periodic revision of them.1 3
1 3Tn addition to these organizations there is the American Trucking
Association, nc. t was organized in ashington in September, 1933;
is composed of 50 state motor truck associations, representing through-
out the country all types and classes of truck owners and operators.
The A.T.A. is a federation of associations, operating without profit
and officered by truck operators for the purpose of protecting and
promoting the interests of the trucking ndustry. t is the
recognized national spokesman for the tarucking industry and contacts
regularly all Federal departaents in wich arise matters pertaining
to trucking and other forms of transportation.
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D. Teamsters Union in the Local Area
1. Historical Setting
The union which has successfully and uickly organized
the trucking industry is known as the nternational Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen and Helpers of America.
The present union was formed in 1903 by a combination of two
earlier organizations: the Teamsters National Union and the
International Teams Drivers' Union.> It was originally known
as the International Brotherhood of Teamsters; later it added
the words t"Chauffers, Stablemen and Helpers" to its name and
still later it dropped the word "Stablemen" and added the
word 'Warehousemen'". n the very early years of the union,
the men were genuine teamsters, engaged exclusively in the
work of local hauling and carting. Today there are naturally
no men left in the union who are genuine teamsters. The
Teamsters is regarded as having made the shift from one type
of skill to another better than many other unions. The reason
for this ease of change is that many of the members who
originally worked as teamsters learned, when they came into
the industry, to drive trucks. Thus the union did not have to
organize a completely new group of workers but could rely on a
nucleus of old-timers to help in organization. In the beginning,
the union was also helped materially by the relative slowness
with which the truck displaced the horse in the type of activity
in which the union was most strongly entrenched: carting and
14Hill, Op. Cit., p. 7.
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drayage around large metropolitan areas, over comparatively
short dis tances.15
Some of the problems of the union at the turn of
the century have a close resemblance to problems of present
locals of truckers. For example, such things as the question
of whether to admit the owner-operator into t union and the
rise of employer organizations to deal with locals still remain
as headaches" of great concern. Throughout the years the union
has followed a fairly regular pattern of craft union policy.
Its membership was fairly constant when considered in relation
to other unions until 1933, wnen there appeared a great influx
of new members from the over-the-road trucking industry (which
had not been organized prior to this time). At first, the
union did not care whether it organized this ndustry or not,
but upon organization f these mid-depression drives, the union
was skyrocketed into the most powerful union in the country
from the point of membership, political influence and economic
influence.
The history of organization of the Teamsters Union
in the New England area and in the Boston area in particular
follows closely that of the nternational Teamsters. In early
1933 the over-the-road and the local drivers were almost totally
unorganized. With the exception of Local 25 in Boston, there were
no locals of any significance. Most of the locals had failed
15Loc. Cit.
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because they had not changed with the times. That is, most of
them did not attempt to organize the new truck drivers, who
had taken over where the Teamsters had been supreme.
The leadership of the Boston local had been as
conservative as that of the other locals which had died.
However, the Boston local gained a great deal of strength with
a new set of officers, hich were elected in early 1933. This
new group was much younger than the old officers and they
sought to build a strorng organization. At the beginning of
1933 the union had only signed contracts with 16 employers in
the area. The union, recognizing the validity of the employers'
argument that in order to maintain a competitive position all
employers would have to be organized, began a very energetic
campaign, which proved quite successful.
A good description of this campaign is given in
Hill's Teamsters and Transportation:
The officers held mass meetings which were widely
advertised. They hired a sound truck and the drive
took on some of the aspects of a political campaign.
The first meeting was held in April, 1933, and 1,000
men attended. Of these, 800 signed applications for
membership. Enthusiasm for the new union ... rose
rapidly. From that time until the meeting of November,
1938, men rapidly joined up. At least 35 were
initiated at every meeting and the number ran as high
as 500 or 600 per meeting. During this period of
organizing, the officers of Local 25 traveled through-
out New England, attempting to promote the formation
of locals in other cities. It was obvious to them
that to raise the scale of wages in Boston, for men
doing anything other than strictly local work, it
would be necessary to raise wages in the rest of the
region and thus prevent loss of jobs from Boston to
lower wage areas.16
1 6Hill, Op. Cit., p. 87.
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Within seven years the union had successfully
organized the vast majority of workers in industry throughout
the area. The employers group has stated that he union today
has been sccessful in organizing all employers in the area.
Naturally, there are owner-operators engaged in over-the-road
and local work who do not belong to the union, but these men
are not the problem today that they once were. In fact, many
of the owner-operators have joined the union in order to be
able to exchange freight with union men at the terminals of
large operators, or have been forced against their will to
join the union to stay in business.
The Teamsters has jurisdiction over practically all
groups of employees in the industry and has gone about organizing
them with great rapidity. But it has never attempted to organize
the mechanics, repairmen, or office staffs, concentrating only
on drivers and persons associated with them in their work. This
latter group mainly consists of helpers, platform men and riggers.
Despite the relative ease of organization, some problems were
encountered during the early campaign, but these were mainly
problems of representation brought about by other unions seeking
to organize the same group of workers.
The unions gained a great deal of per to force
employers to join once it had successfully organized the warehouse-
men. Since most of the truckers had to deal with warehouses in
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one way or another, the union was able to force many employers
into the union by threatening not to service their trucks at
the warehouses. They also used this tactic to prevent the
employers from discriminating against employees who joined the
union. The two oer tactics which the union used to bring
the employers under control were the strike and the discrimina-
tory practice of permitting one employer to operate ~fnile
others were being struck against.
2. Union Strike Polic
Strikes in the industry have been numerous. However,
the tactics used by the union to effect settlement with the
employers have not changed too much over the years. When a strike
does occur, the union usually places pickets at strategic points
to inform outside truckers of the ensuing strike within the
area. n the earlier strikes the union did not permit outside
drivers to enter the area, but more recently they have per-
mitted any truck manned by a union driver belonging to a local
not on strike to come into the area. The local did this for
several reasons. The primary one was that they felt that
allowing outside operators to come into the territory would
break down employer resistance. Although they realized that
this might lead to a permanent contraction of business in the
area, the union was not particularly impressed by this reasoning.
The second reason was that this policy tended to quiet the
outcry of the public that there were emergencies due to
various commodity shortages. But it should also be stated
that in the interest of public relations, the union usually
permits the transfer and delivery of supplies to hospitals
and other public institutions. And certain other shipments
of goods, either perishable or vital to some other industry
(such as films), are also permitted by the union to be carried
during a strike.
The Local offers to let any operator engage in
normal business, if the operator will sign a so-called "blank"
contract proposed by the Local. n effect, this contract
pernits the operator to keep his business going and is
retroactive as regards the final contract negotiation. Of
course, once the Union succeeds in getting one or two carriers
to sign this agreement, especially the larger carriers, the
strength of the Employers Group is weakened considerably.
The work of truckers brings them into contact with
employees and operators of practically all industries. By
refusing to handle shipments of goods to a certain plant which
is on strike, the Teamsters can, in many cases, render valuable
assistance to groups of striking workers in other industries.
Naturally, the locals are therefore besieged by other labor
groups to strike in sympathy with them and give them valuable
aid.
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Although all local contracts contain a provision to
the effect that "employers shall not require drivers to cross
picket lines to pick up or deliver freight," Local 25 has not
always taken advantage of this clause and has on occasion
crossed picket lines. The reasons for this are first, if the
Union were willing to strike in sympathy every time, they would
be involved in practically every strike which occurred and this
would result in serious loss of wages to the membership;
secondly, continual usage of the sympathy strike would only
further weaken the already strained relations with employers;
and thirdly, since the public attitude toward this type of
strike is generally negative, continual participation n them
by the Teamsters would give the group a bad reputation with the
public.
Since it is not difficult to disrupt the operations o:
an individual carrier, the Teamsters Union finds itself with
strike power which is very strong. However, there is one curb
to this power - public opinion and demands. The industry is
engaged in performing a service which is comparable to that
rendered by railroads or public utilities. hen service is
interrupted, there is serious loss and inconvenience to the
public. Though it is not as great as in other service
industries, the stoppage of trucking is still sufficient to be
of importance. When the public begins to demand that an adjust-
ment be effected, a condition arises which is not beneficial to
union interests.
3. Working Conditions
The following summarizes some of the basic working
conditions imposed by the union contract on the employers in
the industry.
Union Shop Policy: The Union prior to 19h47 operated
with closed shop in the industry. With the advent
of the Taft-Hartley Act, the locals switched to a
union shop policy. The basic reason for the early
operations of the closed shop was primarily to
prevent employers from attracting more men than can,
in ordinary times, be steadily employed at a full
week's work." Since the closed shop was determined
to be illegal, the Teamsters adopted the next best
polic - the union shop. Their reason for adopting
this has been the traditional one that only if the
Union's existence is secure can it afford to cooperate
with management and play a constructive role in the
operation of any enterprise.
Seniority: The seniority provisions of the local
contract are very simple. They run similar to the
following: if conditions of business are such that
all employees cannot work full time, senior employees
shall be given preference to the available work. In
addition, seniority is only on the basis of ndividual
establishments, not on the basis of the local union.
That is, it is not to be interpreted to mean that
the oldest members of the local are entitled to
any available work in the local" industry. An
older man who has lost his job with one employer
nay not claim the job of a younger man employed
by another firm.
Promotion Policies: There is no restriction placed
on the employer as regards the promotion of employees
to higher paying jobs.
Check-off: There is no check-off system for collecting
dues. All collections are made by shop stewards or
business agents or the treasurer of the local. The
Union has effected, however, a substitute for the
check-off system. The Contract provides that an
employee shall be a member in good starding, and
that union business agents can remove any men from
the job for not complying with union laws. Thus,
it is evident that the local does have the pser to
remove men from employment if they do not pay their
dues.
"Dead heading: The contract requires that employees
shall not be required to ride as passengers on a
company truck driven by another man on their own time.
Employees must be paid at the regular rate fr all time
spent "dead heading".
Wages: 17 Wages are dependent on the type of work
being done, i.e., road driving, local hauling,
platform work, etc. Outside of periodic wage
increases, the main wage benefit obtained in the
last few years is that of a guaranteed daily wage
for eight hours (if a man is notified for work).
Preference to Available ork: The reference-to-
available-work clause is tied in with the seniority
clause; it states that preference to the available
work sail be iven in the order of seniority,
provided that such senior eployees are available
at such time the work is available.
4L. Enforcement of ihe Contract
Unions have always had difficulty in policing
agreements with various types of employers. Particularly
in this industry, there have always been, and still are,
employers who rationalize that they are perfectly justified in
breaking the contract. And the same is true of a number of
employees, who likewise think it is ermissible to take advantage
of an employer where possible. As can be eected, this type of
industry, with its tough, determined employers, and its equally
tough employees, has problems which are quite complex and touchy.
17 The area of wages in the industry is not within the scope of
this study. This area along with many others is discussed
extensively in Leiter's The Teamsters Union.
The primary union method of preventing contract
violations by employers lies in the appointment of shop stewards.
In addition to being regular employees, the stewards act as
representatives of the union in different garages and terminals
and report any infringements of the contract to the local business
agents. Depending on the local, the duties of the stewards
will vary. Most of the stewards are restricted merely to
reporting grievances to the business agents and collecting
dues from the membership; however there are locals, Local 25
not being one of them, in the New England area which permit
stewards to settle minor grievances directly with the employer,
independently of the union office. Almost everyone with whom
I have talked agreed that it is to the advantage of both
employers and the union to prohibit shop stewards from-
settling grievances directly. The main reason for this was
that the stewards in most cases are not well enough acquainted
with te terms of the contract and therefore may give incorrect
interpretations of the contract.
The grievance procedure of the industry follows that
prevalent in many other industries. When a complaint develops,
the employee involved in the situation tries to adjust the
situation directly with his foreman. If no satisfactory solution
is reached, the employee then reports the matter to the shop
steward. The steward also tries to effect a solution; if he
cannot do so, the case is reported to a business agent.
Wh~en the business agent fails to get a satisfactory solution,
the case goes to arbitration. The arbitration machinery in the
Boston area is set up as follows: the contract calls for the
creation of a six-man committee, composed of three employer and
three union representatives and a seventh man who is an
unbiased judge of the situation, to meet twice monthly. This
group's duties are to "study the mutual problems of each side
in connection with the trucking business, hear complaints of
one side against the other with the view of adjusting the
same on an amicable basis, and particularly to promote the
observance of the contract and its spirit and intent by all
parties involved."18 This procedure is also followed by
Local 25.
lHill, Op. Cit., p. 19h.
CHAPTER IIT
The Problem and ethod of Analysis
A. The Problem Defined
As stated previously, the Teamsters Union is said to
be one of the most powerful unions, if not the most powerful
union, in the United States. t is involved mainly in an
industry which is growing by "leaps and bounds." With this
growth there has appeared a great wave of consolidations and
liquidations among the firms within the industry. Despite
those mergers, there still is associated with it a large
percentage of small operators. One could logically say that
this giant union certainly must be having some effect on this
industry. n addition, these effects may have different
repercussions on the smaller firm as compared to the larger
firm. This, then, is the basic thought or idea behind my
research - to determine the effect, or effects, of the
Teamsters Union on the small to medium-sized trucker.
Upon commencing the preliminary work for the study
and after having read what little material there was on this
particular subject, found myself asking the following questions:
"What effects are there?"; 'Whirch of these should investigate?";
and "How can these effects best be determined?" In addition, there
is the important question of "How to determine, or measure, a
small to medium-sized trucking operation?"
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i sought to answer the first question by interviewing
the Employers Group and several truckers in the Boston area,
and with the help of my faculty advisors. Basically, am
interested in answering such questions as: "Has the union
entwined the small companies in jurisdictional disputes, thus
unnecessarily hampering operations?"; "What is the effect of a
guaranteed wage on these small firms?"; t'What barriers to
expansion, if any, have been caused by union operation in the
industry?"; etc. Questions of this type may be tied into a
central question from which all of the above are derived -
"Wnhat has been the Teamsters' effect on the flexibility of
operations of the small to medium-sized trucker, that is,
how responsive or readily adjustable are the small truckers to
the changing conditions imposed on them by the union?"'
In answering the question Which effects should I
investigate?", have chosen to leave this open for the follow-
ing reason. I was never certain (prior to my investigation)
what effects existed, whether these effects existed in all
firms or whether they affected all firms. This was particularly
so because of the different groups of truckers existing within
the surrounding area. Therefore, was never sure that I would
not find new effects as interviewed each additional trucker.
This sentence indicates that my method of analysis was personal
interviewing. The reasoning behind this decision will be
discussed in the following sections.
When did learn of a new problem and thought that it was
important and might be relevant, would ask the following
interviewees about this problem to attempt to determine
whether it existed with other carriers. n addition, 
sought to answer the question "Whether the Union had brought
any 'good' effects into the industry?" because felt that this
was as important an effect, if it existed, as any that may have
occurred.
Undoubtedly the hardest question to answer before
the study was under way was "How can these effects best be
determined?" I have devoted the next section to a discussion
of this question.
There remains the problem of "How to determine, or
measure, a small to medium-sized trucker?" There are many ways
to give the comparative size of a carrier.2 Of these numerous
ways I have chosen to use two. First, gross revenue of the
carrier should be between approximately $75,000 and $5 million.
This, to me, seemed like a logical cut-off point because the
maximum business done last year by any carrier was approximately
$50 to $55 million. At $5 million gross revenue, a carrier
approaches economy of scale which takes it out of my small-
trucker category. Secondly, if the carrier was doing less than
$5 million, but the management of the company has been separated
from the ownership, did not class the carrier within my
category of small trucker. The reason for this is that,
2See previous section entitled "The Nature of Local Conditions."2See previous section entiled "The Nature of Local Conditions."
although this only happened in a few instances, was not
interested in interviewing people who were not using, and
responsible for, their own invested capital. My rationale
behind talking only to owners was that wanted to determine
whether there was any effect on incentive produced by the
union on the omners. I did not feel that this factgreif it
existed, could be determined by talking to management alone.
In the course of my studg, learned of many areas
which I originally had never thought of investigating. For
example, such problem areas as lack of employer co-operation,
rate cutting by the employers, and some corruption among the
employers were brought to my attention during my interviews.
Some of these became so predominant a reflected into my
other problems, that in a few cases, investigated the prob-
lems further. The results of this side investigation proved
that many of the employers' problems arise within their own
ranks and are not due to the Union.
B. Method of Analysis
After discussing the problem of t"How to determine the
effect of the Union on small truckers?" with various people, 
felt that the best method to achieve my results would be by
personal opinions of the employers in the industry. n addition,
I concluded that personal interviews with carriers would be the
method of getting these opinions. n order to get some con-
sistency into the interviews, compiled a questionnaire which
is given in the following section.
The reasons for choosing personal interviews with a
questionnaire instead of mailing a questionnaire to carriers in
the area (and the country for that matter), which has the
obvious advantage of greater coverage, are the following: First,
there have been no such studies undertaken on this subject,
which forced me to devise my questionnaire from scratch;
secondly, since had to compile my own questionnaire, was
not sure what type of answers might receive, and by taking
the questionnaire around, could direct my questions more
specifically and clear up any ambiguities; thirdly, it was
pointed out to me, and later confirmed this, that this
particular group of employers was not too well educated, and
they might not be capable of answering a questionnaire
competently; and furthly, my taking the questionnaire around,
i was able visually to inspect many operations and learn a
great deal more about the over-all industry than would have
had I sent out the questions. Of course, personal interview-
ing had the effect of limiting the scope of this study to the
immediate area around Boston.
C. The Questionnaire
The questionnaire used was compiled after many
conversations with the executive secretary of the Employers
Group in Boston. Not only did the secretary help me to compile
it but (she) had to check every question to make sure that I
would not be asking the employers something that they would not
be able to divulge or which they would not want to answer
because of fear that it might injure their standing with the
union.3
In looking at the questionnaire several things may
come to mind. First, it appears that I may be forcing pre-
designated answers from the employers, and secondly, the
questionnaire may appear to be too general, vague and slanted.
When conducted an interview, took all of these things into
consideration. When it looked as if were putting words into
an employer's mouth, immediately asked him whey he thought
what he did. Where possible, always attempted to get a
specific example of whatever the employer was trying to tell
me. And when the meaning of a word was too general, or too
vague to an employer, readily attempted to clarify it for
hi..
One point should be made clear at this time. In
conducting an interview used the questionnaire as an aid to
keeping the interview alive". did not merely ask one question
after another. Rather, used the first few questions of the
questionnaire as a means of getting the operator talking, and
as the conversation lagged, fired new questions at the operator.
3! had to give my promise to the Employers Group of Motor Freight
Carriers and to each carrier that would not reveal their names
or give any direct quotes, which might be easily attributable
to them. This gives, think, some indication of the fear that
exists within this industry.
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Undoubtedly, any questionnraire can always be
improved. The first one that devised was much different
from the last one used. But, I feel that the following
questionnaire did serve its purpose and permitted me to
investigate my problem meaningfully.
The Questionnaire:
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~, , .J 
No names or quotations, which may injure your standing
with the union or industry, will be given in the final report.
1) Total number of trucks? Number of tractors and trailers?
Number of small trucks?
2) Total number of drivers? Number of road drivers? Number of
local drcLivers¥ INumDer o elpers Number o patform men-
3) Number of terminals and their location? f they are not
located in the immediate area, what is the reason for their
location - lower wage rates, etc.?
4) Type carrier - common, contract, or private? Is your business
any combination of the three? What advantage is there to this?
) How is your gross revenue doing? At what rate is it increasing?
Have you noticed any sudden or constant decrease in it?
What are the reasons for these increases or decreases? hat
was your gross revenue for last year?
6) Within the next year or two, do you plan any expansion in the
number of trucks, number of terminals, or number of branches?
Why? Why not?
I
i
I
I
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7) Are you planning any long range expansion - three to five
years? Why? Why not?
8) When were you first affiliated with the local Teamsters
Union?
9) In general, do you feel that unions have cut down on your
flexibility of operation? How? Please cite specific
!t ~ examples and/or incidences. (If you cannot think of any
off hand, perhaps some of my later questions will remind
you of some.) Is this problem any greater than other
It ~ imipediments to flexibility, e.g., high truck breakdowns, etc.?
10) Do you feel that the union has hampered your expansion plans?
In what specific ways? Psychologically or incentivrely?
| 11) Do you have any peculiar characteristics about your type of
freight hauling? What are they? Are your operations centered
on a particular industry or type of hauling, e.g., local
vs. intercity? Do you feel that over-all contract negotiation
with the union is inconsiderate of these characteristics?
Please cite specific examples. What do you propose to
correct this inconsideration?! ~12) Is labor your biggest cost? What per cent of total operating
expense is it? Do you have accurate figures to support this?
Do you have any schemes for determining labor cost as you
think it should be figured and not as designated by the I.C.C.?
L
1
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13) Do you feel that ihe union wage demands have been, or are,
just? is productivity keeping pace with wage demands?
Why? llustrate. How do you measure productivity? If
you are using a scheme, did you devise it yourself?
l1) Do you feel that the wage rates demanded by the union are
more suitable to the larger firms than to the small to
medium-sized firms? Why? Illustrate. Do you feel that the
wage rates are more suitable to the intercity carrier than
to the local carrier? TWhy? llustrate.
15) Would you like to see them altered to tche benefit of the
medium-sized firms? Have you any suggestions as to how this
could be accomplished?
16) Do you feel that the wage and fringe benefits have caused a
big increase in operating epense over the last few years?
Is this cost entirely passed on to the customer? What
per cent is? Do you feel that this increased cost is
promoting a greater purchase of trucking facilities by
potential and present customers, so that they can do their
own operations? Are these people really justified in doing
this, i.e., can they actually haul their freigat as cheaply
as you can? What other advantages are there to hauling your
own freight?
17) Are you involved very often in jurisdictional disputes? Can
you cite an example or two?
18) When this has occurred, has your business suffered sub-
stantially, or were you able to circumvent the situation?
How did you manage the latter?
19) In your opinion, has the union offerred great resistance to
technological change? Are you planning to substitute more
capital for labor, e.g., in your terminals, in faster ard
lighter equipment? How do you keep up with such advances?
20) What changes in federal regulation of labor do you think
would benefit the industry (you) the most?
21) Do you feel that the strike power of the union is too great?
Why? How would you like to see it modified? If the unions
did not have the power to strike, how would they be able to
enforce their negotiations?
22) Do the unions practice discrimination against the employers
when conducting a strike in order to get all employers to
sign the contract? Has your farm ever been approached by
them? What do you think the employers as a group should do
to combat this practice?
23) What is your opinion of the union shop policy? Would you
like to see it changed? Why? n what manner? If it is
changed, in hat ways do you feel that you would be better
off?
24) What is he effect of the union on the individual worker?
I
I
I
I
i
i
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25) What is your view on the competitive situation in the industry?
Internally? Externally? Do you find as much co-operation
among the employers, as regards holding to the contract,
as you woul d like to see? hy not? Can you see any way
to improve employer co-operation?
26) What is your opinion of he seniority policy of the unions?
Do you feel that the union is pushing seniority into too
many areas of ahe operation? Is the requirement to keep
older men over younger men cutting doin on your over-
all productivity of operation? Have you ever tried to
measure this effect? Does this hurt you during seasonal
fluctuations more than in "prosperaus" times? How would
you take care of the "faithful" employees if the seniority
clause were omitted?
97)] n trvi] +al t+ . +.h T t _ ri h+.  .n r+ . ~'ti +. ~+_*r -i~+nr
the industry is just? Why? Would you like to see the
indr try become a free-entry industry? Do you feel that
this restriction is causing a lower rate of technological
innovation and progress than would be present if the Comission
did not have these powers of restriction?
28) Do you think that the union has brought any good effects
into the industry? Has it forced the marginal competitor out
of business? Does it keep the employer on his guard more
and not permit him to become complacent?
I- . I __  __ - __ __ " _ - - - - - - -
29) Your contract calls for a guaranteed daily hourly-wage for
some per cent of your employees. What has been the effect
of this wage clause? Does this conflict with your scheduling
problems?
30) Has your company been affected by featherbedding on the part
of the employees? f so, in what manner is this done?
How would you suggest this be corrected? Do you feel that
the contract imposes some featherbedding on the employers?
How?
31) Do you have any disciplinary problems? How is th is taken
care of?
32) Do you feel that there has been some discrimination on the
part of the regulatory agencies with respect to freight
rates? Are they geared to more profitably suit the larger
firms? Why? n what manner could this be corrected?
33) What do you think of the arbitration process of the union?
How would you like to see it modified?
34) Are you, or were you, in the last year or two, considering a
merger or liquidation of your operation? Wuith a larger or
smaller carrier?
35) Have union demands and restrictions been one of the major
forces leading you to think along the lines of a merger?
Why? Can you illustrate this? If it is not a major force
or consideration, what role does labor play in contemplation
of a merger? What other factors are considered?
L
36) Do you feel that there is any, or much, corruption in the
local union?
37) Do you think that there is rate cutting going on within the
industry? f so, how is this being accoimplished?
38) Do you feel that some employers are paying their employees
less than is required by the union, thus permitting the
carrier to carry freight cheaper? Is so, how is this being
accomplished?
39) Do the local business agents have too much power? Why?
Illustrate.
D. Impediments to the Study
In the course of setting up a schedule of interviews
and conducting the interviews, encountered several problems,
which may have restricted the scope and validity of the stucdyr
as far as being an indication of -hat is happening for the entire
group of small truckers within the industry.
The first problem that had to contend with was
getting in the door to interview the truckers. Many of them
did not want to see me because they said that they wanted
"no trouble with the union" and that the Employers Group would
answer all my questions for them*. Others suspected me as
being a union spy. n several instances, was even asked to
show my identification card from school after the truckers had
41 was able to interview 21 employers out of 55 contacted.
I had a total list of 110 carriers in the local area.
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agreed to see me. I would not have been able to conduct the
study had it not been for the help and authority granted to
me by the Employers Group. In a majority of cases, was
granted an interview only after the carriers had checked with
this organization and found that the Employers Group thought
that it was perfectly alright for the operators to answer my
questionnaire. Even after did get to interview the men, 
had to promise them categorically that would in no way
mention their name or incriminate them with the union. In
addition, some men were still suspicious of me, even after all
of the above checks had been made. All of this pointed out to
me the extreme amount of suspicion and lack of trust which
exists in this industry.
The second big detriment to the study was the lack of
education among the employers. A good majority of those that 
interviewed did not finish high school; only three of the
employers had attended college; all, except two, had been a
driver of a truck at one time or another. I am sure that they
all thought that they knew the trucking business, however, as
was pointed out to me by the executive secretary of the Employers
Group; in many cases this is a delusion which they have. In
many instances, when posed a question to an employer, he had
such a blank look on his face that suspected that he had
never before thought of the question or similar questions.
T asked all of them if they had ever attempted to get ay
readings of union activities in other industries, in their own
industry, etc., to enlighten themselves about why unions exist
and what they are after. Only three or four indicated that
they had done this; most of the others complained that they
did not have enough time as it was to conduct their business,
much less read "silly" magazine articles.5
The third largest problem with the study had to do
with the time required and spent to conduct the interviews.
Without an interruption I was able to conduct a good inter-
view in two and a half to three hours not including time to get
to the terminal or office. This only happened twice. Usually,
the interviews tended to last four and five hours because of
the many duties which had to be attended to while I was
attemptirg to interview the employer. n one instance, spent
the whole day at one trucker because the owner got tied up in a
conference with his lawyer about a labor dispute. In another T
had to interview the employer at five in the evening and he did
not show up until seven. Of course, this was expected to a
certain extent, because in a small operation a manager does a
lot more than he would have to do in a large firm. The length
of time required to interview tended to restrict the number
that otherwise might have seen.
T learned from a secretary of one employer who gave me this
type of an answer that this particular employer always took
an hour and a half or two for l1munch every day.
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The fourthl and somewhat minor impediment to the
study was the relatively high cost of interviewing as compared
to sending out a questionnaire. In total, spent approximately
$35 to $40 for interviewing. Soame of this was spent for vain
telephone calls and in three cases vain trips to see a carrier,
all of whom promptly told me that they were sorry but they
could not see me because they were too busy. The other part
was for calls and traveling expenses to arrange and conduct
interviews. This represented an average cost of approximately
$1.70 to $1.90 per interview.
CHAPTER IV
Results of the Analysis
The following discussion is taken from the interviews
! had with local trucking firms. will be at all times relating
the various opinions of the operators on the effects of union
policy on carrier operation. will be giving their views,
their arguments and their reasoning. shall reserve my
observations and conclusions for the final section of the study.
A. General nformation
The number of carriers interviewed for this study
was twenty-one. Of this total, three are exclusively in wool
hauling, two are in heavy machinery transportation, nine are in
general commodity hauling, and seven are in special hauling of
one type or another. Two of the firms in special hauling carry
food products, one carriers sugar, one carries glass, one hauls
produce, one transports various refrigerated products, and one
delivers films. Two of the carriers hauling wool, in addition,
haul general commodities; the produce carrier and refrigerated-
products carrier also haul general commodities. The twenty-
one carriers are broken down into sixteen common carriers, three
contract carriers and two private carriers. Two of the common
carriers also do limited contract hauling.
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Gross revenues of the inrms fall into the following
categories: ten have annual revenues between $75,000 and $99,000,
four have revenues between $200,000 and $399,000, three have
revenues between $400,000 and $699,000, two have revenues
between $700,000 and $999,000, and two have revenues between
$1,000,000 and $2,500,000. None of the firms that attempted
to interview, i.e., firms which contacted but which refused
to be interviewed, had revenues in excess of $2.5 million.
The increase in volume for 1958 over 1957 for the group varied
from a decrease of 20 per cent to an increase of 10 per cent.
All three of the wool haulers indicated a decrease in volum
for wool goods; two of this group showed a net volume gain for
their over-all volume because of sharp increases in their general
commodity transportation. The maximum decrease in volume was
reported by the other wool hauler. In addition, a decrease in
volume of 10 per cent was reported by the film carrier. Four
general commodity carriers indicated losses in volume ranging
from 5 per cent to 10 per cent.
The operating ratios for the group are as follows:
one had an operating ratio of less than 90.0, three had ratios
between 90.0 and 9h.9, eight had ratios between 95.0 and 99.9,
seven had ratios between 100.0 and 104.9, and two had ratios
in excess of 105.0. All firms indicated an increase in their
operating ratio for 1958 over 1957.
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The twenty-one carriers interviewed had from ten
to three hundred pieces of equipment (tractors, trailers, and
small trucks), depending on the size of operations. The
distribution of equipment among tractors, trailers and small
trucks varied according to the proportion of intercity versus
local freight carried. In some cases, the distribution was
also dependent upon the type of freight being handled. The
number of employees for the firms varied from eight to two
hundred. And the number of terminals varied from one to nine.
All except one of the carriers were organized by
the union during the early 1930 membership drives. The
exception was one of the larger carriers who managed to remain
unorganized until 1947.
B. Comments on Seniority
There were two areas of union activity which the
employers consistently and venemently complained about. One of
the areas is that of seniority. The other, which will be
discussed next, is the costliness of over-all contract negotiations.
To every employer that I talked with, seniority was
the biggest infringement of the union upon the right of an
employer to run his business. The arguments of the owners all
have the implicit idea behind them that an employer should be
able to use an employee that is more efficient rather than one
that is less efficient. Such arguments run as follows:
Nor
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older employees in this business tend to become less efficient
because of the very nature of the work. A man who is fifty-
five,although less efficient than a twenty-five or thirty-year-
old worker, still commands the same pay as the younger man.
This does not appear equitable to the younger person or to the
firm. The younger employees have virtually no incentive to
work harder, since their "reward" will be no greater than that
of an older, less efficient employee. "Seniority", according
to one employer, "is set up today on the basis of service,
whereas it should really be set up on the basis of the value
of the particular worker." (Of course when asked this
particular owner how he would measure this "value of a worker,"
he pleaded ignorance of the subject.) The present seniority
system does not permit an employer to take advantage of a new,
young, efficient worker. Rather, such a worker must wait
for the day that his "senior" fellow workers are either sick,
t~~~~~71 au. onr ret4ir "z et he bette i %bs ihin R -Pi m. n,".
employer cited the example that approximately twenty-five
of his employees were in the fifty-five - sixty-year ge
bracket, and he estimated that because of this fact alone his
labor costs were 5 per cent higher than they would be if he
could replace the men with younger workers.
Usually seniority has to do with which employees
get layed-off and returned to work first. The Teamsters' Locals
have carried seniority into the area of job preference. That is
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to say, a man with more seniority, if he is so qualified, can
request a job over a man with less seniority. Employers claim
that this is just adding "tfuel to the fire destroying profits"
because it permits employees to obtain jobs that they are not
sufficiently qualified to handle.
Two illustrations of this point were given to me on
several occasions. First, carriers cited the example of the
older man who has done local hauling (within the immediate
Boston area) for maybe fifteen years. And the worker is
quite efficient at his job. Suddenly the employee realizes
that an intercity run, such as Boston to New York, is more
profitable to him. Although he has never taken a tractor
and trailer to New York before, the employer is helpless if
the employee desires and requests the New York haul. Upon
taking the tractor and trailer to New York, the employee finds
that he is not as good at handling a large truck as he was
with a small truck. The employee who has never handled a
tractor and trailer before is likely to be more accident prone
than the employee who has. And in many cases, the employees
do not know their way around New York, thus taking extra time
and making the trip unprofitable for the employer.
The second illustration has to do with firms which
handle heavy equipment. In many cases, when such jobs are
available, riggers are needed for the work rather than ordinary
truck drivers. However, the riggers may be lower on the
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seniority scale than the drivers, thus permitting a driver who
is not skilled in this work to request and be granted the ob.
Naturally, the employer still needs riggers on the job and
he must send riggers in addition to the drivers. This practice
becomes quite expensive when three or four riggers are needed
because in such a case an employer must send three or four
senior drivers in addition to the required riggers. In
practically all cases this practice makes the job unprofitable.
Employers are even more worried about the fact that
the union will carry seniority into other areas, such as starting
time, overtime privileges and take-home pay. Their fear of this
extension of seniority policy is that such an extension will
prove costly and decrease profits.
When confronted with posing a solution to the seniority
problem, carrier owners made two suggestions. One was to
institute mandatory retirement into the industry. The suggested
age at which retirement should take place varied between fifty-
five and sixty. The second alternative is to remove men as they
become older and less efficient from those jobs which are so
demanding of efficiency and place them in areas where productivity
of the worker is not as critical. The problem with this latter
suggestion is that there are not enough jobs requiring less
efficiency on the part of a worker in the trucking industry and
that a carrier has to be of a certain size before such jobs are
available within the firm.
-
L-·
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According to the eployer, the basic seniority policy
and its extensions into other areas of operation is one that
is cutting heavily into +the profit margins of revenues. Many
of the owners have said that if nothing else could be done
with the union, some type of relief of te present policy of
seniority would be sufficient to permit many carriers to
operate at a reasonable profit, rather than at the resent
losses and near losses.
C. Comments on the Costliness of Over-all Contract Negotiations
A good percentage of the employers interviewed said
that the results of over-all contract negotiations are a very
costly item to them. The reasons given for this high cost to
the employer of over-all contract negotiations by the union
are as follows: the union sets a uniform wage rate for the
trucking industry. This wage rate is the main criterion used
in determining Twhat the various freight rates will be for
different commodities. But many industries in the area are
not in a position, due to the economic situations existing
within their awn industry, to pay such freight rates. The
carriers argue that the freight rates derived from over-all
negotiations are having the followting effects: 1) tend to drive
business away from a firm which is dependent on a "sick" industry
for a major part of its business; 2) tend to induce illegal
rate cutting by firmnns to keep such business; and 3) are forcing
many present customers to do their own freight hauling.
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Several examples can be given to illustrate the
above reasoning. First, consider the wool industry. Everyone
realizes that the wool industry is a "sick" industry in
general and that it is practically "dead" in the New England
area. The Teamsters Local sets wage rates for the trucking
industry, and such wages determine what the various commodity
freight rates, including wool, will be. The wool haulers
claim that such wage rates, reflected through freight rates,
are too high for the wool industry. "They (wage rates) are
only making a sick industry sicker." n effect, the wage
rates are inconsiderate of he particular industry and of a
considerable group of carriers who haul wool products.
"This high cost of labor is causing the wool haulers to lose a
lot of business." This loss of business is quite severe for
those carriers who have no other commodity hauling rights.
This fact, no doubt, explains the high loss of wool haulers
which has been predominant in the last few years.
A second illustration uses a film transportation
company. Similar to wool, the film industry is not in a good
situation in terms of present day economic standings. The
film haulers find themselves in the same predicament as the
wool haulers. n addition, the film haulers maintain that wage
rates for them are even higher than for other segments of the
trucking industry due to the high rate of overtime incurred for
Saturday and Sunday delivery of films. The film carriers claim
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that te overtime clause is extremely inconsiderate of their
particular industry.
Two other type of carriers are being affected
similarly to the film haulers. The carriers hauling a good
deal of food products and the carriers hauling produce also
have a high rate of overtime because of the Saturday delivery
required by their customers.
A third illustration of the adverse effect of over-
all contract negotiations is shown in the case of the heavy
equipment haulers. In the Boston area the heavy equipment
haulers are subject to the Teamsters Local 25. Again these
carriers are subject to the wage rates negotiated by Local
25 for the local trucking industry. Equipment haulers
outside of the Boston area are affiliated with a building
trades' union which has wage rates that are lower. The
lower rates make the equipment haulers outside of Boston more
competitive. First, they can, assuming a uniform freight rate
for carriers around and outside of Boston, provide more and
better service, and secondly, the equipment haulers within the
Boston area have to contend with illegal freight rate cuts
offered by the outside group.
The local carriers offer the above reasons and
illustrations to sow that over-all contract negotiation is
costly from the point of view of decreased profits and decreased
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business revenues. The carriers maintain that the Teamsters
is not considerate of their individual problems and that the
Union's only interest is to '"force the small carrier out of
business".
As remedies to the situation, the carriers would like
to see more locals which are concerned with carriers in
individual industries, and many carriers would like to be
disaffiliated from the Teamsters Local and affiliated with
unions which are predominant in the industry for which the
carriers haul goods.
D. Comments on Labor Costs for Local vs. ntercity Freight Hauling
Of the carriers interviewed, none of them was strictly
a local carrier or strictly an intercity carrier. It was a
fact, though, that many of the smaller carriers received a
large percentage of their revenues from local hauling. One
carrier estimated that 90 per cent of his revenues was from
local freight transportation.
Characteristically, the outcry of the carriers
handling a good percentage of local freight was that their
wage rates were too high compared to the carrier hauling a
large portion of intercity or long haul freight. This is
manifested by comparing the percentage of labor costs to total
revenues for carriers doing mainly local hauling and for carriers
doing mainly intercity hauling. Labor costs as a percentage of
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total revenues for local haulers ranged between 60 per cent
and 70 per cent, with one carrier going as high as 7 per
cent; for carriers in long haul work, this percentage ran
between 40 per cent and 0 per cent. The local carriers offer
several reasons for this high wage cost of handling local
freight. The primary reason is that in local hauling a great
deal of time is required for loading and unloading a truck.
Secondly, the guaranteed-daily-wage effect on local hauling
has been to force the cost of local freight up due to the
relative difficulty with scheduling local hauling. n
addition, much of the local freight hauling has some connection
with moving goods to and from the waterfront, where, because of
the method of handling freight, a truck can be tied up for an
extra two or three hours.
The carriers handling local freight are also subjected
to added competition from one-and-two-truck firms operating
only in the Boston area. Such smaller firms, not required to
be licensed by the .C.C., are able to quote much lower rates
for two reasons: first, the firms do not usually have to pay
union wages, and secondly, the finms are not subjected to the
rates quoted for I.C.C. carriers.
The plea from the local carriers is that the type of
hauling - local vs. intercity- should be taken into consideration
~when Union contracts are negotiated. As the situation presently
stands, many carriers are hauling local freight and losing money
with every load they carry. The solution of the local carriers
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to the problem: a separate contract for wages for local
freight hauling.
E. Comments on Wage Rates, Productivity and Fringe Benefits
All carriers maintained that the wage rates of the
industry are too high and are "rising faster than productivity
of the employees." All maintained this theory, but only three
of the carriers had a method of indicating productivity or
what the carriers thought to be productivity. The remainder
of the carriers merely judged productivity "through their
managers and through their own eyes".
The three carriers having a scheme for measuring
productivity use similar methods. Basically, the idea is to
determine the revenues generated and the costs associated with
the operation of a truck. Then a crude measure of productivity,
and all of the carriers agreed that it is crude, is the ratio
of revenues to costs for a particular truck. Finally, a plot
of the above ratio versus wage rates indicates a relationship
between "productivity" and wage rates. Using this method
of measurement for productivity, the three particular carriers
showed me plots of productivity versus wage rates which indicate
that productivity is not keeping pace with wage increases.
The carriers were also quick to note to me that they had
corrected and accounted for increases in maintenance costs.
1
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According to the unamimous opinion of the carriers,
the high wage rates and high fringe benefits are having two
effects on the operationsof the industry. irst, wage rates
and fringe benefits reflected through freight rates are citting
seriously into the profits of the industry. The over-all
operating ratio of the individual carriers for the last few
years is cited to sport this point. Secondly, wages and
benefits are promoting the purchase of trucking equipment by
present customers. This second point is very acute for
carriers whose business is associated with three or four
big accounts. As the carriers point out, "once we lose one
or two of these big accounts, we are in serious trouble."
F. Comments on Technological Change
The general reply to questions involving technological
change was that there have not been, and are not presently,
enough technological changes in the industry to get a proper
view of union policy on such changes. Carriers generally agree
that the Union has been somewhat reluctant to accept changes at
first, e.g., the fork lift truck, but after time the Teamsters'
Local has usually consented to the change.
One illustration which indicates the union's complete
refusal to accept a change is the new highway system. Today
the New York trip requires seven hours, on the average, for
one way. In the past, the trip required ten to eleven hours.
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The Union today still requires that the carrier pay for the
New York trip at a ten to eleven-hour rate ra+ther than at a
seven-hour rate. This union policy is also true for trips to
other major cities in the area. Carriers with a lot of long-
haul business are quite disturbed with the above union policy
for trip rates. Such carriers maintain hat the refusal of
the union to permit pay for long hauls at new rates is making
the carriers non-competitors with other means of transportation,
especially the railroads.
To illustrate the relative lack of interest of many
carriers in potential use of devices to help speed up freight
delivery, an example of the limited use of radio by carriers
follows. As pointed out earlier, many of the carriers handle
a lot of local freight which requires excessive pickups and
delivery. t seems so obvious that the radio which has been
used in other industries and in other capacities to a similar
work advantage - speeding up pickup and delivery - might be
used by many carriers. It also seems obvious that the use of
the radio by carriers for local freight should save precious
time because it would permit a truck to pick up and deliver
goods without returning to the office for instructions. In
addition, radios can be used for giving instructions to trucks
on medium haul trips. Yet,. of all the carriers interviewed,
only one used such a setup. The comments of the carriers not
using a radio system about the advantages and savings of it were
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that the system would only be profitable for the very large
carriers and that they had never heard of any of the carriers
using radio. (To show how wrong the carriers can be, the sole
firm using a radio has twenty-five trucks, does approximately
$300,000 in business, and, according to te owner, has effected
labor savings of 5 to 8 per cent with the use of the radio.)
G. Comments on Strike Power of Union
The general opinion of the strike power of the union
is that the power is too great for the industry. Although a
few concede that a strike in the trucking ndustry is no
different from a strike in other industries, others maintain
that there is a great gap between the freight industry and
other industries. This latter group points to the fact that
the trucking industry is a service industry, one for which
there is no adequate substitute. The railroad industry, they
assert, is only an adequate substitute for long hauls; the
railroads cannot provide sufficient service for local hauling.
Through the use of "playing one carrier against
another", the union has succeeded in putting the industry at
the "mercy of union demands". Two illustrations of this union
practice were cited in many instances. First, the union has to
its advantage the fact that many of the larger carriers are
heavily financed through bank loans and notes. e larger
carriers, because of loan payments, seem to concede readily
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to the union on strike issues. In addition, many of the smaller
carriers are also in financially precarious positions and must
yield to union pressures to get trucks operating and obtain
much needed revenues. Secondly, in recent years the union has
permitted, during strikes, outside trucking firms to operate
within the jurisdiction of Local 25. This practice has led to
a great deal of "stealing" of business by the non-local carriers,
much of which is never regained. For example, in the major
strike of 1955 Local 25 permitted two carriers of substantial
size from New York City to operate in the Boston area. The
two carriers picked up so much business that they both
established terminals in this area. It has been estimated
that one of the carriers establishing a new terminal has
picked up $500,000 in business in the area since 1955.
Carriers argue that an operator cannot afford to
stay out on strike unless all carriers remain on strike
because once one carrier returns to work, that carrier begins
to steal business of carriers still on strike. And once business
is lost it is hard to recapture because it is a service business,
and one carrier can perform the service as well as +the next.
The contention of the small carriers is that they
haven't a chance against the union individually and that their
only hope is to band together. But after they band together,
the small carriers are still helpless unless the larger carriers
also go along with them.
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To replace the outright strike power of the union,
carriers would like to see a modification of the present policy.
Before a strike is permitted, the union and representatives of
the carriers should plead their case for and against a strike
before an unbiased arbitration committee, which will determine
iwether a strike is ustified. If the committee decides that
the union has just cause to strike, then this same committee
should conduct a secret-ballot strike vote of the individual
workers to determine whether the employees want to strike
or wish to continue working.
H. Comments on Union Shop Policy of Teamsters
The comments, pro and con, on the union shop were
split about fifty-fifty. Several carriers were not in favor
of the policy because the policy states, in effect, "that some
men - leaders of the union - want to be paid tribute before a
person can continue to work for a trucker." The biggest fault
found with the union shop policy was the policy's disastrous
effect on a worker's incentive and individuality. According
to this argument, the individual becomes "non-existent" when
he has to join a union to work. Usually the men work at the
pace of the slowest worker in the group. Many of the carriers
stated that whether to join the union should be up to the
discretion of each worker; others comment that since a worker
is to get the benefits of the union, the employee should join.
If all employees did not join the union, there would only be
additional friction in the firm between union members and non-
members.
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The present policy of membership, although disliked,
is said to be much better than the old policy of a closed shop.
The big advantage of the present policy over the preceding
one is that the current policy over the preceding one- is that
the current policy permits carriers to hire a person of their
own choice and not a person already in the union. In the past,
the group which the union tried to push-off on the employers,
when employees were needed, was the "tworst from the viewpoint
of productivity and trouble-making".
One change which carriers would like to see in the
membership policy of the union is an extension of the thirty-
day trial period to sixty or ninety days. Carriers feel that
a lengthening of the trial period would permit the employer to
more accurately determine whether a worker fits into the firm
or not.
ith reference to the thirty-day period before employees
have to join the union, employers have developed an interesting
practice. Until employees join the union they do not receive
any company benefits and are not placed on the company seniority
list. Although all carriers would not admit the point, a good
percentage of the owners indicated that employers have instigated
the practice of laying off many "trial-employees"' after twenty-
nine days of work, thus preventing such employees from being
placed on the seniority list. As I understand it, there is now
a regular group of employees who shift from one company to another,
after working for one firm for a ime less than thirty days.
i. Comments on Union Effect on ncentive to Expand
The trucking business is one that displays an
indication that economies of scale can be gained through enlarge-
ment and expansion of a business. t would seem quite logical
that the smaller films would be enthusiastically attempting to
reap the benefits of enlargement through expansion of their
present facilities. But the majority of the small firms in
the trucking industry do not display this enthusiasm. I am
quite certain that there is more than one reason or element
in the industry dulling this aggressiveness. However, one
reason which appears to be having a deleterious effect on
expansion is the Teamsters Union.
There is a feeling among the smaller firms that
after a certain point", which varies depending on the firm,
there is no reason to expand further. Two reasons are cited
for this feeling. First, above this certain point, an employer
seems to lose control of his business from a financial view-
point and secondly, an employer seems to gain a lot of additional
headaches from labor and the union. "Sure", one of the
carriers cites, ,T can double my profits but T would have to
quadruple my business."' 'I do not see what is in it for me
except a little extra money and a lot of extra headaches
especially from labort Most carriers are willing to expand
their businesses as new customers appear in their territories,
but few are willing to seek to merge and buy up additional
territorial rights.
Carriers also cite the fact that their firms could
take on a lot of extra business now, but labor costs are so
high that a majority of the extra business would be non-
profitable. One carrier cites the guaranteed daily wage as
a detriment to his expansion. He claims that he could add
three trucks to new routes obtained but would only need the
men on the routes fr four to five hours. However, the employers
have to guarantee the workers eight hours, which sends the
wage bill to such an amount that the business becomes
unprofitable.
J. Comments on Featherbedding
Featherbedding operations do not seem to have hit
all of the carriers. Still, such operations seem to be very
bothersome with some carriers. Complaints are given of three
featherbedding techniques which operators maintain are very
costly. First, there is the practice of requiring two men
on an operation which no longer needs two men because of
modern leading methods. To illustrate, take the example of
two men on a tank truck hauling liquid sugar. Certainly there
is no need, this particular carrier stated, for two men on
such an operation. The policy is a carryover from the days
when all sugar was sent in packages. Or, take another
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illustration. Through modern loading techniques many goods
are now palletized whereas in the old days such goods had to
be loaded piecemeal. Today there is no need for a helper on
such operations, and the practice of requiring a helper on
such trucks is merely making such jobs non-profitable.
The second practice of featherbedding has to do
with what is known as "dropping a box" or leaving a trailer at
a particular customer's operation to be loaded over night or
during the day by the customer. if a carrier does drop a box,
the carrier must charge the customer, in addition, for the use
of a tractor and the wages of a driver for the tractor even
though the driver and tractor are not required on the job,
and may not be required for a day or so. This practice
places an unwarranted impediment on carriers having large
customers. Not only is it extremely costly for the customer,
carriers say, but since the customers are large enough t ship
trailer-loads, the customers begin to think about buying their
own equipment and doing their own shipping.
The third practice of featherbedding is one that
requires two men on a truck when there is at least one piece
of goods above a certain specified weight (which varies according
to the particular commodity). Employers complain of the fact
that there may be only one such item which is overweight, yet
the helper must remain with the driver for the entire trip,
even though the helper may be needed only once on the trip.
This practice is extremely costly when a truck is out on a
trip for the entire day. Again, the practice pushes the cost
of shipping freight up and makes many shipments non-profitable,
carriers say.
K. Comments on Advantages and Benefits of the Union
Most of the employers agree that the union has raised
the standard of living of employees. n addition, the union,
it is agreed, has effected fairer treatment of employees and
practically eliminated employee discrimination. However,
today the employers think that the union has lost much of
its usefulness, has become "money hungry", has become
impractical by trying to organize any "body of employees",
and is not concerned with individual problems.
Carriers in general feel that one big advantage that
the union has brought along with employee organization of the
industry is a standardization of wages and rates. This
standardization (subject to the arguments given previously in
"Comments on Wage Rates, Productivity and Fringe Benefits")
has theoretically introduced a common base other than price
from which carriers can operate. That new base is service to
the customer.
On the other hand, carriers feel that the union has
made the industry extremely cost conscious. In addition, the
union has, carriers feel, forced the industry to do some much
needed thinking about how to increase the efficiency of
operations. Employers also voiced the opinion that the union
has been a big factor in forcing marginal employers out of
existence. But carriers also claim that the union is creating
many new marginal operators who cannot profitably incorporate
into their firms the ever-increasing union wage demands.
L. Comments on Competition within the ndustry
The big feature in competition within the industry
today is service, service and more service. The carrier who
can give the customer adequate service gets the customer's
business and keeps the business only as long as the carrier
continues to provide good and uninterrupted service. Once
service is discontinued, for one reason or aom ther, the business
is likely to go to a second carrier, quite willing to give
the service required. The one phase of competition which
carriers cannot fight adequately is illegal rate cutting which
goes on within the industry. Comments will be made on illegal
cutting of rates in a later section.
Competition is keen from all segments of the trucking
industry - common carriers, contract carriers and private
carriers. Undoubtedly, competition will remain as lively as
it is today as long as the present number of carriers remains
within the industry. As competition grows keener, a number of
carriers can be expected to leave the industry.
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Of all forms of internal competition the rise of
private carriers seems to be that Which is the greatest challenge
to the position of the general commodity carriers. This point
is illustrated by the new surge of truck sales and truck
rentals to manufacturing firms. According to carriers, the
reason for this increase in private truck sales and rentals
is the increased cost of transportation brought on by the
increased wage demands of the union.
The expansion of private carriers is not to be
carried to its logical conclusion - that all freight business
Twill eventually be handled by private carriers. With an
expanding economy, common carriers can be expected to handle
more and more freight. What the private carriers will do,
however, is to increase the cost of freight handling for
common carriers. Private carriers will do this by removing
much of the business having a large volume associated with it
from common carriers. This particular business holds down the
over-all cost of freight handling.
Carriers who deal mostly in local freight hauling will
always have their own competition problems with the one- and two-
truck freight haulers. The very small truckers are able to
bid down the price of local freight hauling because they are
not required to pay union wages or charge commission freight
rates, since these intrastate trackers are not required to be
licensed by the I.C.C.
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Externally, railroads with their various schemes of
piggybacking loom as the major competition. Carriers only
seem to be concerned with the competition of railroads on
long hauls - over 200 miles. On trips under 200 miles,
employers say that railroads cannot provide the service
desired by customers. Certainly the only saving in cost,
truckers note, can come on the longer haul.
M. Comments on Federal Regulation of Labor
Although carriers in general stated that they were
not qualified toappraise the Federal regulation of labor,
all carriers expressed the view that the secondary boycott
clause should be eliminated from the Taft-Hartley Labor Act.
With the permission of te Federal government, through
Taft-Hartley, the local union is able to include within its
contracts a clause which states that Union employees shall not
be forced to enter firms under jurisdiction of other labor
unions, which are ergaged in labor controversies. n addition,
Taft-Hartley permits tie so-called "hot cargo clause". (Note
should be made of the fact that the legality of the hot cargo
clause is currently in a state of lux. Thne Supreme Court is
presently involved in some key decision-making on this particular
question.) The hot cargo clause states that Local 25 employees
shall not be forced to handle goods of truckers under jurisdic-
tion of other locals that are engaged in labor disputes.
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Doth of the above contract clauses, carriers claim, are "axes"
which are being held over the head of the industry and can be
enforced upon the industry at the discretion of the Union.
Carriers claim that this discretionary power is unwarranted.
N. Comments on Regulation of the ndustry by the nterstate
Commerce Commission
The eneral attitude of the carriers toward the .C.C.
appears to be favorable. Most of the employers agree that the
IC.C., through its powers to restrict entry into the industry,
has taken the edge off the old competitive feature of the
industry- "cut-throat" pricing. The .C.C., carriers state,
has added stability to the industry and converted the trucking
industry into a service-type industry. Although some carriers
feel that the price far the present stability within the
industry (gained through restrictive entry) is a lower rate
of innovation and new ideas, there are a few employers who
think that since the industry is regulated and therefore
income is somewhat restricted through preset freight rates,
carriers are forced to develop innovations which will cut
industry and firm costs.
There is a feeling among the smaller carriers that
both wage increases and freight rate increases are more
suitable to the larger carriers. The smaller firmnns maintain
that the larger fimnns, because of the great volume of freight
handled, are able more easily to incorporate lower freight
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rate increases and hiher wage rate increases than the maller
firms. On te other hand, as a carrier pointed out to me,
if you talk to a big-volume carrier that carrier will indicate
that there is no sucn discrimination on rates; the difference
in prosperity between the large carrier and small carrier is
determined by whether the carrier handles a majority of long-
haul or short-haul freight. Small carriers feel that the
answer to the freight rate and wage rate problems lies in
more cnsideration by the .C.C. of the small carrier's
problems and more representation of the small carriers on
T!.C.C. Is committees a rate bureaus.
Another fault which all carriers find with the
T... is the delay in time of freight rate increases.
Carriers maintain that as soon as the union gets a wage
increase the increase becomes effective immediately, yet
the carriers cannot petition the T.C.C. for freight rate
increases until after wage increases go into effect. Even
after petition is made, a period of six months to a year or
more usually elapses before increases are granted.
Carriers connected with "sick" industries find their
business dwindling quite rapidly. As such operators put it,
"the only way to stay alive is to get new business." But, +the
.C.C. does not permit a carrier to get new business unless a
carrier is given a right to haul new commodities. Under tle
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present .C.C. policy, the Commission makes no distinction
between whether applicants for new routes are in sick"t
industries or not. Small carriers maintain that this distinc-
tion should be made in order to protect carriers presently
in the industry.
A final plea from small carriers has to do with a
revision of I.C.C. merger policy. Presently, small operators
feel that the .C.C. is catering to the larger firms on this
question. One carrier points to the fact that he has had a
merger petition before the .C.C. for to years and merely
received a few comments from the .C.C. that the merger is
still undergoing study. Yet, two large mid-western carriers
decided to merge and were permitted to do so within six months.
. Comments on Employer Co-operation
Carriers agree that their biggest problem is not
dealing with the union, but dealing with themselves. "For if
the carriers could learn to respect and trust one another,
90 per cent of the problems developing with the union would
be automatically solved."tt
Why can't the carriers as a group become as strong
as the union? This question is asked time and again by
individual carriers and by the Employers Group of Boston.
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The answer seems to be a conglomeration of industry characteristics
wnich have developed and evolved as the industry developed.
One characteristic which has always been with the industry is
the financially weak carrier, both large and small. The big
carriers ave note payments to ake, and t little carriers
want to stay in business. So one or two such carriers sign
thle new union contract, and all carriers sign the contract.
And many times, as one carrier put it, firms which are not in
a financial predicament will sign the union contract just for
the selfish reason of stealing business from other carriers.
Another industry characteristic is that of corruption.
Truckers have always been prone to illegal tactics, and
carriers maintain that the proneness still exists today.
Perhaps the worst element of this corruption is that which
involves carriers and union members in illegal pay-offs. One
carrier summed up the situation very nicely when he said:
"There is no honor among thieves.t
Since the development of the trucking industry, there
has been a basic mistrust of one operator of another. No one
seems to be able to give any reason far it, except that mistrust
is an inherent characteristic of the industry. As one might
expect, tis mistrust leads to a great deal of animosity and
hypocrisy among the nemployers. Some think the answer lies in
the fact that the employers are uneducated and cannot appreciate
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the problems which the industry faces, and as a result are only
worried about the problems which they face individually. Others
feel that the carriers are just unable to communicate with one
another at meetings. Still ohers feel that the problem is the
usual one of apathy.
P. Comments on Corruption within the ndustry
Corrupt and illegal operations within the industry seem to
be centered on two activities: rate cutting ard employer-union
payoffs. Illegal rate cutting, employers informed me, is accomplished
in one of the following ways. First, a carrier may bill the
customer prior to shipment for a certain poundage of goods; When
the carrier sends a truck to pick up the goods, the customer will
have an amount of goods in excess of the poundage noted on the
freight slip. Secondly, the carrier may bill the customer prior
to shipment for a certain commodity which has a specified freight
rate. Upon actual delivery, however, the customer will ship a
commodity which has a higher commodity freight rate. I am told
that all rate cutting has to be done in one of the above methods.
Any other scheme will be noticed by the Commission, if the Commission
decides to check company records. 1
1All of the carriers admitted that rate cutting now goes on within the
industry. Yet, after telling me that the practice existed, all of the
carriers, save one, emphatically stated that their firm, of course,
was not one of the culprits. Their reaction was justified, naturally.
After all, why should any carrier trust me with such information.
The one "honest" carrier said quite frankly that he was not afraid
to admit that he was using rate cutting to keep some of his business.
HTe stated that he felt that many carriers were doing it and that
other carriers were trying to steal his business by the very same
method. In effect, he feels that he is being forced to cut rates.
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Employer-union payoffs, according to carriers,
although not as prevalent as rate cutting, nevertheless
exist. Such payoffs take two forms: first, to business
agents and secondly, to stewards. ?ayments to agents and
stewards usually take place because the carrier is breaking
some contract clause and does not want it reported to the
union.
Another form of illegal operation is carried out
through the payment of wages. Some carriers, am told,
still manage to get away with paying an employee a weekly
wage, while having the employee work more than forty hours.
Although this scheme is not too prevalent, carriers maintain
that it still is practiced by smaller operators.
Carriers also feel that some operators are using
trucking companies as a front for illegal activities being
conducted elsewhere. have been told of one such operator
in this area. There certainly could be others.
Naturally all of the above activities within the
industry tend to lend little harmony to the already strained
relationships existing among employers and between employers
and the union.
CHAPTER V
Conclusions and Problems for Further Study
A. Conclusions
The purpose of this study has been to determine ,dat
the effects of the Teamsters' Union are on the operations of
small trucking firms. The method of analysis used to attack
the problem has been subjective. To the extent that the
conclusions are based on this method of analysis, they are not
as sharply defined as one would like to make them. Also,
the number of firm interviewed in this study obviously limits
the amount of confidence that can be placed in any conclusions
g-ven. Although the study has not revealed a set of irrevocable
conclusions about the Union's effect on the small carrier, it
has, on the other hand, raised many questions and revealed
many interesting areas for further study.
Results of the analysis show a strong indication that
the union has two sources of power. First, there is the source
of power hich might be called causal factors, i.e., factors
which operate within the industry to strengthen the union's
position. The lack of employer co-operation, the use of over-
all contract negotiation, corruption and the effects of
competition are all examples of this type of power. Secondly,
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the union has inherent power because of the type of industry
that it operates within and because of the method of operation
of the union. Examples of this inherent power are respectively
the strike power and membership policy of the union. Thus
these two sources of power permit the union to exert orce on
the industry, particularly on small carri ers. Before discussing
some of the effects of he power on the employers, each of the
above areas will e examined.
One of the major factors by which the union gains a
lot of power is the lack of employer co-operation in facing
the union on important issues. Regardless f the source of
attitude among the carriers, frmly believe the remark made
to me that 90 per cent of the carriers' troubles with the
union would be eliminated if employers could learn to cooperate.
t opinion as to this lack of co-operation is that it exists
primarily because of the corruptive nature of the industry, and
secondly because of the lack of education, which might over-
throw -the corruption. One point is certain - as long as the
carriers continue to display thaeir ashort-sightedness by not
cooperating wil one another, mnion problems will remain more
complex than such problems would otherwise be.
Another reason for lack of employers t co-operation is
+he fierce internal competition whnich eists ~within the industry.
There is every reason to believe that this comrpetition will not
slacken in intensity during the coming years, especially in view
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of the fact that many carriers will be attempting to increase
volume and gain economies of scale, to counteract rising costs.
Two forms of external competition for all truckers in general
are on the rise. One is piggyback operations of the railroads
and the other is the rise of private carriers. Piggyback
competition will only be effective on long hauls - in excess
of 200 miles; hereas private carrier competition will cut
into all types of freight hauling. Carriers probably will
eventually tie in with major railroads, if piggyback operations
can be shown to save enough money. The rise of private
carriers will probably push up the over-all cost of general
commodity freight hauling. The reason for this increased
cost is because private carriers will remove business which
has a large volume associated with it, leaving the general
commodity carriers with all of the piecemeal work. As noted
previously, the piecemeal freight is much more expensive to
haul +than large-volume freight.
Another very big source of union stability is caused
by the over-all contract negotiations which the union imposes
on the industry. The small carriers attribute to this union
policy an increased costl of operation placed predominantly on
the small carriers. The reason for this predominance is the fact
lT say increased cost of operation because the effects of over-all
contract negotiations, as listed in a previous section, although
not direct increases in cost of operation indirectly increase
costs of operation.
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that the majority of the business of small carriers is
characteristically associated with one industry or with one
or two firms within an industry. Inat is needed to eliminate
this effect are more locals which would be concerned with
individual industry problems. Where this solution is not
feasible because of the relatively small amount of freigat
Within the industry, individual carriers should be permitted
to ask their employees to sever relationships Ei+h the
Teamsters Local and to join te major union of that industry.
To prevent this same problem from recurring, employers,
through the mployers Group Association, should seek to
educate non-unionized carriers' employees to enter a union
which will not severely hamper a carrier's operations.
The final factor which contributes to union strength
is the corruption which exists within the industry. Why is
the industry noted as a front for corruptness? The answer
lies in the evolution of the industry. nThe persons who
originally were involved in the industry maintained illegal
side operations and such operations have been carried forward.
Even today operators themselves seem prone to practice
activities which,although not illegal, are definitely in my
opinion malpractices. One example of this is the newly
developed practice of operators of hiring a person and then
purposely firing that person before he is put on the union
seniority list. Since employees are not admitted to the union
until a trial period of thirty days is completed satisfactorily
with an employer, feel quite certain that the idea behind
this employer tactic is to mitigate union power by hampering
union membership. As long as carriers are prone to illegal
activities, can see no way for them as a group to effectively
fight he union.
The preceding factors which contribute heavily to the
union's strength become even more forceful when added to the
inherent power of the union. The biggest such power is the
strike. Because of the exposed nature of the employers'
operations, the union is able to wield a good deal of control
over the employers by the threat of strike. Again, this power
has no greater force against the smaller carrier than the
larger carrier. The problem concerning strikes can be solved
by two means. First, all employers, large and small, must band
together so that the carriers will become as strong as the
unions during contract negotiations. Secondly, employers and
the union will find it to their advantage to introduce machinery
which will decrease the number of strikes and provide orderly
processes for settling many disputes arising during the life
of a contract.
Additional power is gained by the union through its
strong membership policy. All carriers agreed that the present
meambership olicy - union shop - of the union was infinitely
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better than the old policy of a closed shop. The arguments
against the union shop, it seems to me, are mainly of a
philosophical nature. The effects of such a membership scheme
by the unions have been no different than in any other industry.
The carriers' pleas for an extension of the thirty-day
trial period to sixty days is a valid plea, if it is made for
the reason given. However, if the carriers are just looking
for a extension of their present malpractice - the firing
of employees after twenty-nine days to keep the employees off
the seniority list, am not in favor of granting the extra
time. n my opinion, the first thing that the carriers must
do to show that they are sincere in seeking the extension in
the trial period is to eliminate their present malpractice.
Perhaps the best way to accomplish this eimination is through
the Employers Group.
As a res'ilt of the strength of the union, carriers are
being seriously effected by many union policies. One of the
most serious effects is coming from the seniority program of
Local 2. if seniority is strictly enforced a d employers are
not allowed to discharge older workers as they become inefficient,
it seems possible that carrier operations can become more costly
as they become less efficient. The fact that many of the workers
employed will reach +the upper age limit of their usefulness at
one time will accentuate the problem. The effect of this policy
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may possibly force some carriers to operate at a loss or force
the carriers out of business. n my opinion, whiat is definitely
needed is an examination of the seniority policy by both the
carriers and the Union to determine how seniorityr can be
modified to decrease its potential effect on the operators
and still maintain adequate old-age protection for union
members.
The extension of seniority policy into other areas of
operation, such as job preference, also appears to be increasing
cost of operation in some cases. To mitigate the effect of
job preference on the employers and still provide he advantage
of job preference to employees a better system of determining
w hether an employee is qualified for a job is needed.
The effect of seniority on small carriers does not
appear on the surface to be greater thmn this same effect on
large carriers. Rather, the problems associated with seniorty
are industry problems and not problems of segments of the
in dus try.
Another factor affecting the small carriers is the
high rate of local freight hauling. There is no question that
local freight hauling is more expensive than intercity freight
hauling. One need only look at the operating ratios for
carriers doing both types of hauling to see how much more
costly local freight hauling is. n addition, the labor cost
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for local hauling is much higher. This leads me to the
definite conclusion that there should be a separate contract
for local hauling. The small carriers hauling local freight
need this separate contract so that they can more adequately
compete with the one- and two-truck, non-licensed operators.
The discussions concerning wage rates and productivity
have left me with no specific conclusions as to whether
productivity is keeping pace with increasing wage rates or
not. One problem which has been predominant in any attempt
to correlate wage rates and productivity is how to measure
productivity. t is not enough to use personal observation,
which is usually biased depending on which side one represents,
as the criterion. What is needed before any definite con-
clusions can be drawn is a set of criteria to evaluate
productivity. These criteria can then be applied to individual
carrier operations over a period of time to obtain a roper
perspective of productivity as a function of wage rates.
WTage rates and fringe benefits are rising in the
industry. t has not been within the scope of this study to
determine how the trucking industry wage rates and fringe
benefits compare to other industries. My feeling is that
they are out of line with other industries since increased
wage rates and benefits are forcing freight rates up to a
point where profits are being seriously decreased, and are
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inducing present customers to purchase trucks to do their
own freight hauling. Th s is a problem which all carriers
face; but to the extent that a majority of e business of
the smaller carriers comes from one or two major accounts,
this problem is more severe for the small carriers.
Although technological change has not been too
predominant lately in the industry, it creates one of the
most important problems for union policy. When technological
progress takes place, its benefits can be realized by the
public, the operators or the employees. Such benefits can
appear as lower prices, higher profits or higher wages.
in the early years of the industry, there was a good
deal of technological change. The benefits of the early changes
were divided between the public and the employees, through
decreased rates and increased wages. As more changes appear
it will be interesting to see how the benefits will be shared.
With the rising cost of operation, it seems to me that the
carriers should be allowed to reap some benefits (through
increased profits) through any additional technological progress.
One factor is evident to me about the attitude of
small carriers toward technological innovation. The small
carrier is quite lazy and dependent upon someone else)to do
any thinking on his own. Characteristically, the replies to
my questions on this subject were that "ttif the big carriers
do not use it, how can I."
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Among the small carriers there is a pessimistic
feeling about the advantages, from a union-management
relations point of view, of expanding and adding capital to
their present enterprise. There also seems to be an inherent
feeling among the small carriers that economies of scale can
be gained up to a certain point and after that a carrier
merely creates jobs. A good test for this would be to
interview larger carriers and get their opinions of this
observation. Ideally, a statistical study of all sizes
of carriers would be the best way to approach the observation.
However, to what extent these feelings can be separated from
other attitudes which might also have an adverse effect on
additional investment of capital in the business is a question
that cannot be answered.
Featherbedding practices have not been too frequent
in the industry. But, to be sure, there have been some. Such
practices only do one thing - increase the cost of operation.
The schemes of featherbedding hit all types of carriers and
all sizes. On the other hand, the practices seem to be
employed more in local operations than in intercity operations.
Since small carriers are predominantly in local transportation,
featherbedding has increased the cost of operation of small
carriers.
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The eneral benefits of the union, as expressed by
the carriers, have been what one generally hears the benefits
of the union are. To me, the biggest benefit of the union has
been the stability of the industry, brought about by
standardization of wage rates and freight rates. This
standardization has brought about a common base of operation -
service to the customer. n addition, it has brought about
an extremely cost conscious set of operators who realize that
the more efficient they make their operation, the more profit
they will make.
in addition to the above effects, the carriers are
subject to an outside force which operates within the industry.
That outside force is the nterstate Commerce Commission. The
Tnterstate Commerce Commission's policy toward carriers is not
as clear as it could be. The I.C.C. should instill some
scheme whereby carriers would not have to wait as long as they
now do for freiight rate increases after wage rate increases
have gone into effect. The present I.C.C. policy is certainly
depriving all carriers of much needed revenue and taxing
carrier profit margins very heavily. The I.C.C. 's policy on
hauling rights should be re-evaluated so that consideration
is iven to carriers - generally small carriers - that find
themselves losing business from one particular industry. f
the .C.C. 's policy on commodity rights is changed, there would
be fewer weak carriers in the industry and the employers as a
group would be strengthened. Finally, the I.C.C. should
reorient its policy on mergers such that the policy is not
one favoring one group of carriers - particularly the large
carriers. The above changes in .C.C. policy in general
would favor all carriers, but also would help small carriers
to become more stable.
In summary, the trucking industry is still relatively
young and during its life has witnessed a phenomenal growth.
There is every reason to believe that the growth of the industry
is not completed and that the future will witness considerable
expansion. The number of firms operating within the industry
is large, and consequently many of the individual enterprises
are small in terms of business volume, number of employees and
invested capital. There is reason also to believe that the
size of the individual firm will increase, and the number of
firms within the industry is likely to decrease due to union
regulation of wage rates and Interstate Commerce Commission
regulation of entrance into the industry.
The small carriers't answers to my queries lead me to
believe that the present local's seniority policy, method of
over-all industry contract negotiations, lack of consideration
for whether firms mainly operate locally or between cities,
policy on wage rates, and a few subtle schemes of featherbedding
are increasing operating costs for the small carriers above what
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such costs are for tne Larger carriers. In turn, the high
operating costsAare forcing many custmners to purchase
trucking facilities and do their own freight hauling,
preventing small carriers from adding much needed revenues
to their volume, and causing many small carriers to operate
their enterprises at a loss. To the extent that such cost
increases are preventing the small carriers from responding
to changing conditions affecting the operation of their firms,
the union is hampering the flAxibility of operation of the
small carriers.
Hoever, the study has revealed that the industry is
complex and many factors in addition to the union enter into
the decisions affecting the operation of a trucking firm.
Carriers are plagued wit a lack of employer co-operation.
If carrier co-operation could be increased, there is every
indication that the efforts of the union would be greatly
mitigated. The industry is still suffering from corruptive
forces operatirng within the firis and between operators and the
union. As long as carriers persist in cutting rates illegally
and entering into illegal side agreements ' with the union, he
chances of greater co-operation among the carriers and between
the carriers and the union are slim. in addition, the regulatory
policy of the nterstate Commerce Commission is such that the
small carriers feel that the Commission is discriminating
against *the small operators in the industry. To the extent
that these other forces are operating within the industry
and seem to influence the decisions of the operators, such
forces may be having an adverse effect on the carrier operation.
Moreover, many o the adverse effects of the union may be
overestimated and enlarged due to the presence of the other
forces.
Of course the validity of the above conclusions is
dependent upon the honesty and integrity of the operators
interviewed. personally believe that the problem areas
discussed exist and are not rmer-ely "creations" of the carriers.
My chief reason for this belief is that all of the carriers
expressed deep concern with many of the aforementioned
problems.
B. Problems for Further Study
The study has revealed the following areas for
further work:
1. A study of the organization of employers should be
undertaken to try to isolate and define the problems involved
in getting employers to cooperate. In addition, a program
designed to educate the employers in the industry with the
problems they face as a group and the problems they face as
individuals might be undertaken.
2. A study of the aims and goals and policy of the
local Teamsters Union should be made. Such questions as
"twhat rationale lies behind Local 25's policy?"; To what
extent is the local policy a promulgation of the nternational
Teamsters Union?"; "To what extent is the policy the philosophy
of local officers?"; might be looked into.
3. A study of the regional policy of the nterstate
Commerce Commission should be made to define ad isolate what
the Commission's effect is on local carriers. n addition,
the question of authorizing freight rate increases should
be investigated.
h. There appears to be some evidence that there is an
optimum size that a carrier should seek to be. A study should
be undertaken to determine what criteria, both statistical
and subjective, can be used to determine such an optimum size,
if this optimum actually exists.
5. A study of the policies of the rate bureaus
should be undertaken to determine how such bureaus operate,
who influences them more, large or small operators, and the
role of the rate bureaus in the trucking industry.
6. f seniority is strictly enforced and employers are
not permitted to discharge older workers as they become inefficient,
it seems possible that the industry may be faced with very
serious problems as many of the younger men reach old age.
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This problem is particularly acute in this industry where
manual labor plays a great role in the efficient operation
of a firm. Therefore, a study should be nmade to determine
what alternatives might be feasible substitutions for the
current seniority policy.
7. Although difficult, a study should be made of the
role that corruptive orces have played in the development of
the industry and the part such forces are currently playing.
Another study might be undertaken to see what could be done
to combat the illegal activities, e.g., rate cutting, of the
operators.
8. The carriers feel that because they are involved in
a service industry the union operating within the industry
should have its (union) pers curtailed. A study should be
made comparing union operation in other service industries to
union operation in the trucking industry.
9. There should be a study undertaken to determine what
type of contract negotiations might be used in place of over-
a1l contract negotiations. Such a study should carefully
determine, if possible, te extent to Mich union strength
might be diminished.
10. A study should be made of the over-all wage rate
structure of the industry, with particular emphasis on whether
there should be two different rates for local freight hauling
and intercity freight hauling.
-,10-
11. A study might be undertaken to determine to
what extent increased costs in the trucking industry have
influenced businesses to purchase freight hauling facilities
and to do their own freight hauling.
APPENDIX
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TABLE I*
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION - INTERCITY COMMON CARRIERS
OF GENERAL FREIGHT FOR UNITED STATES AND NEW ENGLAND-
MIDDLE ATLANTIC AREA FOR 1954.
Percentage of Number of Carriers
Characteristic United States New England
Total Middle-Atlantic
Number of Carriers 1120 391
Operating Revenues
($1,0o0)
Less than 400 18.7 19.2
400 to 699 22.0 29.9
700 to 999 12.9 14.3
1,000 to 2,499 22.3 21.5
2,500 to 4,999 13.8 9.0
5 000 or more 9.3 6.1
100.0 100.0
Operating Ratio
(percent)
Less than 90.0 4.1 2.3
90.0 to 94.9 16.7 11.0
95.0 to 99.9 53.7 54.2
100.0 to 104.9 20.1 25.6
105.0 or more 5.4 6.4
100.0 100.0
Ratio: Current Assets
to Current Liabilities
(ratio)
Less than 0.5 3.8 2.6
0.5 to 0.9 24.1 26.6
1.0 to 1.4 29.5 32.0
1.5 to 1.9 13.5 13.4
2.0 or more 24.1 20.2
100.0 100.0
Ratio: Labor Cost to
Operating Revenues
(percent)
Less than 20.0 3.3 2.6
20.0 to 29.9 3.7 3.6
30.0 to 39.9 11.2 11.3
40.0 to 49.9 29.3 24.5
50.0 to 59.9 41.3 46.2
60.0 or more 10.7 11.8
100.0 100.0
"Blue Book of the Trucking Tndus try, Transport Research, Inc.,
Washington, D.C., 1955, p. viii.
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TABLE II
INTERCITY COMON CARRIERS OF GENERAL FREIGHT FOR 1954
dollars, miles, tons, United States New England
shipments in thousands- Total
add 000
Number of Carriers 1 ,120 130
Operating Ratio (%) 97.1 98.3
BALANCE SHEET ITEMS
Current Assets
Cash
Receivables - Net
Carrier Oper. Property-Net
TOTAL ASSETS
Current Liabilities
Long-Term Obligations
Insurance Reserves
Injuries, L and D Reserves
Other Reserves
Capital
Surplus
NET WORTH
OPERATING REVENUES
Freight Revenue-Intercity
Truck load
Less truck load
Frt. Rev-Local Cartage
Intercity tpn-other class IMC.
Other operating revenue
TOTAL EXPENSES
NET Operating Revenue
Net Carrier Operating Income
NET Income BEFORE Taxes
NET Income AFTER Taxes
PRI1MARY OPER. ACCOUNTS
MAINTENANCE Expense
Supervision
Repairs, Service-Rev Equip.
Line Haul
P and D
TIRES and tubes-Rev. Equip.
Line Haul
P and D
All Other
TRANSPORTATION Expense
Supervision
Drivers and Helpers
Line Haul
P and D
FUEL - Rev. Equip.
Line Haul
P and D
341,315
103, 654
155,443
448,428
875,880
232, 732
213,417
1,504
11,556
3,515
129,922
250,531
380 453
2,358,009
2,330, 614
804,205
1,340,977
19,911
3,550
3 ,385
2,289,891
63,117
67,424
55,962
28,308
245,601
9,574
167,964
139,068
22,336
52,800
46,262
4,115
15,212
1,076,305
29,453
576,183
317,777
235,517
99,443
81,840
12,840
21,382
4,762
11,571
29,597
54,424
17,726
12,913
105
568
79
8,770
1 ,404
20,174
135,323
133,350
32,300
72,930
1,370
359
244
133,044
2,279
2,165
1,360
401
14, 507
508
9,956
7, 629
1,177
2,994
2,402
235
1,049
59,733
2,217
38, 547
17,624
16, 601
6,753
5,105
747
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TABLE II (Continued)*
dollars, miles, tons, United States New England
shipments in thousands- Total
add 000
OIL - Rev. Equip 5,461 336
Line Haul 4,392 259
P and D 775 30
Purchased transportation 330 ,971 8,649
All other 34,686 3,231
TERI4INAL Expense 366,099 19 152
Supervision 109 ,169 5,040
Platform Employees 177,3887 10,072
All other 79,038 4,040
TRAFFIC Expense 84,123 4,808
Supervision 49, 226 2,741
All Other 34,907 2,067
INSURANCE and Safety Expense 115 668 8 179
Supervision 10, 717 380
PL and PD 41,107 3,443
Worlmen's Compensation 15,484 1,569
CARGO loss and damage 35,126 1,857
Fire, theft, collision 7,402 669
All other 5,824 261
ADMINISTRATIVE Expense 176,974 13, 559
Supervision 88, 528 7, 365
All other 88 ,460 6,194
DEPRECIATION Expense 102,190 6,611
Line Haul - Frt. Equip. 68,494 4,019
P and D 9,728 432
TAXES, Licenses - Operating 128,722 7,260
Gas, fuel and oil 48,881 3,066
Line Haul 40,249 2, 316
P and D 5,620 332
Vehicle Licenses and Fees 44,766 1,433
Line Haul 36 , 731 1,034
P and D 4,941 183
"Blue Book of the Trucking ndustry, Transport Research, nc.,
Washington, D.C., 1955, P-. ii.
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TABLE III
LOCAL CON4ON CARRIERS OF GENERAL FREIGHT FOR 1954
dollars, miles, tons, United States New
shipments in Total England
thousands-add 000
Number of Carriers 212 6
OPERATING RATIO () 96.9 100.2
BALANCE SHEET ITEMS
Current Assets 28,601 327
Cash 6,338 110
Receivables - Net 14,310 150
Carrier Oper. Property-Net 29,008 277
TOTAL ASSETS 73,790 696
Current Liabilities 15,064 148
Long-Term Obligations 8,774 49
Insurance Reserves 65 -
Injuries, L and D Reserves 603 1
Other Reserves 425 40
Capital 18,179 226
Surplus 26,694 226
NET WORTH 44,o73 452
OPERATING REVENUES 143,588 1,791
Freight Revenue-Intercity 32,863 700
Truck load 2,963 -
Less truck load 2,815 -
Frt. Rev-Local Cartage 106,331 1,026
Intercity tpn-other class IMC 1,524 -
Other operating revenue 2,870 65
TOTAL EXPENSES 139,144 1,795
NET Operating Revenue 4,444 4
Net Carrier Operating Income 4,412 4
NET Income BEFORE Taxes 5,464 9
NET Income AFTER TAXES 3,435 9
PRIMARY OPER ACCOUNTS
MAINTENANCE Expense 16,276 174
Supervision 729 10
Repairs, Service-Rev Equip. 11,275 101
Line Haul 1,700 40
P and D 4,385 16
TIRES and tubes-Rev Equip 2,447 23
Line Haul 437 5
P and D 854 3
All other 1,835 40
TRANSPORTATION Expense 72,517 931
Supervision 3,564 45
Drivers and Helpers 55,846 760
Line Haul 7,414 135
P and D 25,453 168
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TABLE III (Continued) *
dollars, miles, tons,
shipments
in thousands-add 000
FUEL - Rev Equip
Line Haul
P and D
OIL - Rev Equip
Line Haul
P and D
Purchased transportation
All Other
TERMINAL Expens e
Supervis ion
Platform Employees
All Other
TRAFFIC Expense
Supervis ion
All Other
INSURANCE and Safety Expense
Supervision
PL and PD
Workmen' s Compensation
CARGO loss and damage
Fire, theft, collision
All Other
ADMINISTRATIVE Expense
Supervision
All other
DEPRECIATION Expense
Line Haul - Frt Equip
P and D
TAXES, Licenses - Operating
Gas, fuel and oil
Line Haul
P and D
Vehicle Licenses and Fees
Line Haul
P and D
United States
Total
New
England
5,255
740
2,117
331
52
136
4 290
3,207
10,868
2,257
6,390
2,219
3,112
1,553
1,559
6,138 .   e11
246
2,687
1,396
1,210
313
285
14,545
8,307
6,238
7,037
746
2P 189
8 838
2,491
316
575
3, 614
421
781
68
14
12
2
I
31
25
128
21
79
28
60
36
24
110
41
36
18
3
12
213
139
74
86
16
97
29
7
17
4
"Blue Book of the Trucking Industry, Transport Research, nc.,
Washington, D.C., 1955, p. xiii.
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TABLE IV
UNITED STATES TOTALS FOR 1954
dollars, miles, Grand Intercity Local
tons, shipments Total
in thousands-add 000
Number of Carriers 2,615 2,163 452
OPERATING RATIO (%) 96.9 96.9 97.4
BALANCE SHEET ITEMS
Current Assets
Cash
Receivables - Net
Carrier Oper Property-Net
TOTAL ASSETS
Current Liabilities
Long-Term Obligations
Insurance Reserves
Injuries, L and D Reserves
Other Reserves
Capital
Surplus
NET WORTH
OPERATING REVENUES
Freight Revenue-Intercity
Truck Load
Less truck load
Frt Rev-Local Cartage
Intercity tpn-other class IC
Other operating revenue
TOTAL EXPENSES
NET Operating Revenue
Net Carrier Operating Income
NET Income BEFORE Taxes
NET Income AFTER Taxes
PRINARY OPER ACCOUNTS
MAINTENANCE xpense
Supervision
Repairs, Service-Rev Equip
Line Haul
P and D
TIRES and tubes-Rev Equip
Line Haul
P and D
All Other
TRANSPORTATION Expense
Supervision
Drivers and Helpers
Line Haul
P and D
595 059
190, 290
284,996
713,342
1,481,839
397,779
305,910
2,6835
16, 00
5Y555
276,208
426,584
702,792
3,811,435
3,476,1380
667 810
1,366,306
265 ,961
29,983
30,606
3,693,438
117 ,947
117,190
108,371
60,117
406,072
14,921
275,706
203,199
29,375
86,945
67,770
5,767
28,021
1,877,245
51,970
912,004
479 377
287,006
527 164
171,067
243,710
655,307
i,319,327
358,403
283,954
9 544
15,827
4, 779
230,912
374,325
605,237
3,499,792
3,397,281
864,416
1,363,182
45,663
26,309
21,3834
3, 369 , 66
109,926
109, 134
96,010
52,131
370,360
13,313
251 393
197, 665
23 ,467
8,i210
66, 147
4,474
23,936
1,719,743
44,591
792 765
461, 117
245,070
67,895
19, 223
36,286
5O 035
162,012
39,376
16,956
141
973
776
45,296
52 259
97,555
311,643
78, 399
3,394
3,126
220, 298
3,674
8,772
303,622
3,021
83,056
12,361
7,986
35,712
1,608
24,313
5,534
6,403
5,735
1,623
1,293
4,085
157,502
7,379
1193239
13,260
41,936
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TABLE IV (Continued)*
dollars, miles tons,
shipments in
thousands-add 000
FUEL - Rev Equip
Line Haul
P and D
OIL - Rev Equip
Line Haul
P and D
Purchased transportation
All other
TERMINAL Expense
Supervision
Platform Employees
All other
TRAFFIC Expense
Supervision
All other
INSURANCE and Safety Expense
Supervis ion
PL and PD
Workmen's Compensation
CARGO loss and damage
Fire, theft, collision
All other
ADMINISTRATIVE Expense
Supervision
All other
DEPRECIATION Expense
Line Haul - Frt Equip
P and D
TAXES, Licenses - Operating
Gas, fuel and oil
Line Haul
P and D
Vehicle Licenses and Fees
Line Haul
P and D
Grand Intercity Local
Total
169 957
122,517
16,766
9 3759 , 7 -5
6,767
1,022
661, 523
71,846
446,272
123,929
201,375
120,937
109,379
60,609
49,279
133,357
14,007
73, 508
25,591
43,723
12,676
9,323
291,734
150,600
141,023
172,600
101,171
13,630
207,730
73 348
54,110
6,723
74,113
49,679
6,258
158,636
119 ,397
13,565
3, 632
6,569
313
650,724
63,859
422,716
119,285
16, 032
115 370
103, 135
57,508
45,636
170,010
13,521
67,553
22,102
46,232
1 1,964
8,610
258,072
132,756
125,205
157,014
98 462
10,433
190,179
73 ,380
53, 225
5,927
67 346
4, 678
5,180
11,321
2,620
3,203
743
198
204
10,799
7,987
23, 556
4,644
13,343
5,567
6,744
3,101
3,643
13,847
466
5 955
3 489
2,491
712
713
33, 663
17,844
15,013
15,586
2,709
3,197
17 551
4,968
nol301
6, 765
1,001
1,078
Blue Book of the Trucking Industry, Transport Research, Tnc.,
Washington, D.C., 1955, p. xv.
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